Vincent Cable: How many whole-time equivalent NHS staff are employed in monitoring and reporting upon national performance targets; and how many there were in 1996.

Patricia Hewitt: The data are not held centrally. However, we are committed to reducing the number of national targets. That number has reduced from 28 in 1996 to20 for the current three-year planning round.

Vincent Cable: If the Secretary of State cannot answer the question directly, does she accept that the need for constantly collecting information and reporting on targets is a significant contribution to the doubling of management staff since she came into office, as opposed to a 30 per cent. increase in medical staff? Is she aware that if management staff had increased at the same pace as medical staff, there would be 12,000 fewer and the NHS would have saved about £500 million a year—a large part of its deficit?

Tony Baldry: How does the Secretary of State justify the Oxford Radcliffe Hospitals NHS Trust losing 600 NHS posts, including managers? She might like to reflect on the fact that on Sunday, some 5,000 of my constituents, along with Labour councillors and representatives of Unison, the Transport and General Workers Union and the GMB, all gathered together to express concern about what is happening to the health service in Oxfordshire, and to the Oxford Radcliffe Hospitals NHS Trust in particular.

Patricia Hewitt: Of course I understand the concerns that the hon. Gentleman raises, which are reflected among his constituents and among the staff and their unions. Let me reassure him, and particularly the staff who are facing a very anxious time, that the Oxford Radcliffe and any other hospital in a similar situation will do everything it can to avoid compulsory redundancies and to support staff to be redeployed, where necessary, to new jobs. Does the hon. Gentleman accept, however, that with medical technology changing, and with huge and unacceptable variations in the quality of care and the value that is given to patients by different hospitals, it must be right to expect hospitals to use new medical technology and best practice to become as effective as possible in their use of resources? That means difficult decisions in some places, but we should have the courage to take them, and he should have the honesty to support them.

Steve Webb: The Secretary of State will be aware that the monitoring of performance targets is undertaken not only by NHS staff, but by patients' groups. Will she therefore investigate as a matter of urgency the case of Queen Mary's hospital in Sidcup, which has had problems with hygiene in the past and which has reportedly cancelled two inspections by its own patients' forum—it has told the patients' forum that it cannot investigate hygiene by using torches to look under beds? Will she investigate that refusal to participate?

Patricia Hewitt: Of course I will examine that specific case, which I was not aware of. The Healthcare Commission routinely inspects all health care providers in order to make sure that they are raising standards to the highest possible level. The hon. Gentleman has made the extremely important point that inspecting and reporting on the quality of care, which requires a certain amount of management time, is essential if we are to give patients the best possible care, which is what we all want.

Patricia Hewitt: My hon. Friend has rightly referred to the exceptional improvements in many aspects of NHS care. Indeed, he might have been thinking of the improvements in accident and emergency. Those improvements have got rid of those appalling trolley waits, which was a direct result of our target. The benchmarking exercise to which my hon. Friend has referred is one of many ways in which every hospital can examine its own performance to see where it can do even better and improve the care that it gives to patients. My hon. Friend supports such improvements, and we will ensure that they continue.

Paddy Tipping: In those meetings, did the Minister note the strong feeling among patients, carers and clinicians that the early prescription of those drugs leads to a higher quality and longer life? All those people believe that early prescription slows long-term decline—what is the Minister's view?

Andy Burnham: I am aware of those strong feelings. It is crucial that the appraisal process is carried out properly, and, as my hon. Friend knows, that process is still ongoing. Independent clinical experts should be the ultimate arbiters, but it is also right that the strength of feeling among patients throughout this country is voiced through their parliamentary representatives, which my hon. Friend has done today.

Ann Winterton: Is it not morally wrong that people with dementia are prevented from having the relatively inexpensive drugs that will prevent that dementia getting worse? Preventing people from having those drugs is a false economy, because when dementia deepens, the cost of looking after the patient is much greater.

Andy Burnham: The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence was set up to take on the difficult questions that we face in judging the clinical effectiveness of treatments against their cost-effectiveness. The hon. Lady would perhaps be the first to complain if that judgment was being made by Ministers. It is important to make it clear that existing patients will not be affected and will continue to receive these treatments. However, we all want the process to take place fairly and, ultimately, an independent judgment to be made on the evidence.

Joan Walley: Having been to local meetings of people concerned about the use of these drugs, I know that it is a huge benefit for people to able to have them in the early stages of Alzheimer's disease. When my hon. Friend speaks to NICE, will he ask it to consider the contribution that those drugs make to a more independent, less stressed, and perhaps even happier life?

Andy Burnham: The NICE process has been undertaken with unprecedented thoroughness. My hon. Friend refers to the early stages of the disease, and the use of drugs at that time is precisely the issue that is being examined in depth and will be considered during the appeals process. I am sure that the strength of feeling that she represents will be heard, but ultimately it is right that an independent judgment is made by people who are experts in that illness.

Nicholas Winterton: May I declare an interest in that I am patron of the east Cheshire branch of the Alzheimer's Society and therefore take a huge and close interest in this subject? Does the Minister accept that society has a duty to enable those who suffer from Alzheimer's, even those in the early stages of that disease, to have the best quality of life that is available to them, and that that means the use of the most advanced drugs? Will he ensure that the best drugs are available to give those with Alzheimer's the best quality of life that this House would wish them to have?

Andy Burnham: Of course, there will be no division between Members in wanting to ensure that people get the best quality of life that they can. That is precisely what NICE is considering in terms of the difficult judgment that must be made. As a former Chair of the Health Committee, the hon. Gentleman will know that a balance must be struck between the available resources and the benefits that this particular treatment can offer. We have collectively asked NICE to investigate those difficult questions for us, and we all have a duty to support it through this difficult process and ultimately to consider fairly its recommendations.

David Kidney: Does it worry my hon. Friend that if the NICE guidance is implemented there will be less support in future for patients in the early stages of Alzheimer's? Can he at least give assurances about the things that matter to those patients and their carers: early identification of Alzheimer's cases; more support for the patient, the family and the carer; and more research into finding treatments that will be effective in the early stages of that disease?

Andy Burnham: The hon. Gentleman must respect that the appraisal process that NICE has gone through is extremely detailed and that it has examined all the available evidence. Indeed, the appraisal process continues—it is right that it should do so and that the questions that he identifies are properly considered. However, is it right for us to second-guess the independent experts? Is it right that we should set up NICE only to undermine—

Andy Burnham: Provision of complementary and alternative therapies on the NHS are a matter for primary care trusts and local NHS service providers. The Government believe that decisions on individual clinical interventions, whether conventional, complementary or alternative, are for local determination.

Andy Burnham: The hon. Gentleman knows that we have provided more information about the available complementary therapies. Recent figures show that around 50 per cent. of GPs are making such therapies available to patients and evidence shows that people are getting access to those service. Of course, they should always be based on the evidence available and a balance must be struck. However, locally, the matter is for clinical decision and it would be wrong to mandate such treatment or to rule it out from the top down. It is for doctors to decide.

Andy Burnham: I agree that such treatments or therapies should be prescribed or made available to patients on the advice of a clinician, and that that judgment should be made in the best interest of the patient. When there is doubt about the evidence base for a particular treatment, people should err on the side of caution.

David Drew: How much was allocated to the Gloucestershire Strategic Health Authority in 2005-06; and if she will make a statement.

David Drew: I thank my right hon. Friend for her response, and I apologise for the typo in the question. It should of course say "Avon, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire Strategic Health Authority", but that somehow got lost in translation. It would, however, be much easier if we were just dealing with Gloucestershire. The letter that the Minister of State, my hon. Friend the Member for Don Valley (Caroline Flint), sent to the hon. Member for Tewkesbury (Mr. Robertson), whom I see in his place, concluded by saying:
	"However, we would expect the new organisations to inherit the liabilities and obligations of predecessor organisations."
	If that is the case, would it not be appropriate to have complete transparency within a strategic health authority such as Avon, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire, so that we can understand exactly where the deficits have come from? There is a great deal of unfairness involved in offloading deficits on to areas that have not created them, and the people involved believe that they are quite within their rights to feel let down.

Andrew Lansley: Does the Secretary of State realise that primary care trusts in Gloucestershire are currently planning not only to recover deficits and restore balance this year, but to do so after having their budgets top-sliced so that Gloucestershire is contributing to deficits in Avon and Wiltshire as well? That could have substantial consequences for services in Gloucestershire. As the hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. Drew) is aware, the closure of the Stroud maternity unit is being contemplated. Will the Secretary of State tell us whether she intends the PCTs to go beyond restoring financial balance and initiate a cut like that closure?

Patricia Hewitt: I have made very clear that we expect each of the regions to establish financial balance. Within that, there must be discretion for specific areas and organisations. I have spelt that out, and we repeated it most recently in the report on the financial situation that I published alongside the chief executive's report.
	What the hon. Gentleman has said reflects the fact that not only has there been overspending in Gloucestershire, despite substantial increases in the budgets, but there are even larger problems in Avon and Wiltshire—many of them deep-seated problems that have been continuing for years. For far too long, those organisations have expected other parts of the NHS to bail them out.
	None of the proposals have been finalised. The plan for the Stroud maternity unit needs to be considered on the basis of what will give women the best and safest maternity services within the budget that is available to that health community. I hope that instead of continuing to pretend that an unlimited sum is available and difficult decisions never have to be made, the hon. Gentleman will support the NHS in every part of the country, helping to ensure that it can provide the best possible services for patients and the best value—

Andrew Lansley: Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
	The Secretary of State is trying to resolve the situation in a single year. The point is that Gloucestershire is prepared to try to resolve its financial deficits; what it objects to is having to contribute this year, on top of that, to the resolution of deficits in other places some of which have been around for years, and will be around for years.
	I return to the question. We have asked the Secretary of State repeatedly to avoid short-term, financially driven cuts that will be to the long-term detriment of the service. In her manifesto, she said
	"By 2009 all women will have choice over where and how they have their baby".
	Thousands of women in Stroud and related areas want to be able to choose to have their antenatal care or delivery at the Stroud maternity unit. Will the Secretary of State promise that in 2009 they will be able to exercise that choice?

Patricia Hewitt: Those are decisions that need to be made locally and on the basis that the best and safest care is provided to all patients, within the available budget. As I understand the current proposals, the Gloucestershire SHA will contribute some £6.5 million to the regional reserves, with somewhat more being drawn down in that county to compensate for the overspending in its health service. In the maternity services, continuing support will be given to providing home births for those women who choose them and for whom they are safe, although midwife-led care must also be available as part of the broader service. Those difficult decisions will be made locally, in the context of the Government's very generous national settlement.

Patricia Hewitt: My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Part of what we are doing is to establish everywhere end-of-life care networks that draw on the expertise available in some parts of the NHS and also in the Marie Curie cancer care programme. We will continue to develop the training programme that has ensured that many more community-based staff are trained in palliative care. We must ensure that more palliative care and hospice services are available, both in the community and in people's homes. In that way, the majority of people—who would prefer to die at home or in a hospice—will no longer be forced to die in hospital, which is where most people die at present. That is another example of the shift of care from hospitals into the community, which is the best care that we can offer patients.

Bob Spink: I thank the Secretary of State for the help that the Government have given recently to plug the short-term funding gap for children's hospices. Will she say something about how we can get together with the Association of Children's Hospices to develop a fair, sustainable and long-term funding policy for those hospices?

Robert Flello: I also thank my right hon. Friend for the £27 million that has been announced for children's hospices, but end-of-life care is not just about making the end of life as caring as possible. It should also be about exploring all possibilities to prolong quality of life. Will she agree to meet me as soon as possible to discuss the case of my constituent Kath Withington, who has been denied the Tarceva drug, even though her consultant and GP recommended it? People who may be in their last months or weeks should have access to all the treatments that might prolong their lives.

Patricia Hewitt: I am always happy to meet my hon. Friend but, on the more general point, it must be right that we ensure that NICE evaluates drugs, and that the drugs that it recommends are available right across the NHS. However, we must not try to substitute ministerial decisions for NICE's recommendations. We played our part in establishing NICE, and in speeding up the evaluation of the growing number of new drugs now available.

Karen Buck: What representations she has received in respect of the management of Kensington and Chelsea Primary Care Trust's deficit.

Ivan Lewis: Since March 2005, Health Ministers have received two letters in respect of the management of Kensington and Chelsea Primary Care Trust's deficit, both of which came from my hon. Friend. In addition, the chief executive of Kensington and Chelsea Primary Care Trust met Sir Nigel Crisp, the former chief executive of the NHS, on 16 December 2005.

Karen Buck: My hon. Friend is aware that Kensington and Chelsea PCT has an ambitious programme for recovering a deficit that is rooted—in this case—in past financial mismanagement under previous managers. My concern is that in addition to the underlying deficit the PCT is also subject to the top-slicing that applies to all London PCTs. In the interests of transparency, and because that additional pressure is causing difficulty for the social and mental health services, will my hon. Friend explain how much has been generated by top-slicing in London, where that fund is being held and when PCTs and others will have the opportunity to learn how that resource will be ploughed back to help authorities struggling with their deficit?

Ivan Lewis: The strategic health authority was asked to come up with an appropriate plan for London, to deal with the overall situation, and it was felt right that Kensington and Chelsea contribute 3 per cent. of its budget to help tackle the deficit. In terms of the consequences of the contributions made by that PCT and others, my hon. Friend is right to say that they should be open and transparent. The SHA should make absolutely clear how much money it has received from the process, how it intends to spend those resources and the consequences for patient care throughout London. I urge her to engage in dialogue with the SHA about how that information can be put into the public domain as soon as possible.

Kevin Barron: While I accept the fact that all children may not need eye tests, may I ask whether the Government have ever conducted any surveys to make sure that no children have fallen though the net, as they obviously will not know whether or not they need an eye test? In my childhood, such testing used to take place in schools.

Caroline Flint: My right hon. Friend is right about the measures that we should put in place to see whether children require a more extensive eye examination, which is why, as part of the national service framework for children, young people and maternity services, we have developed, as I said, an orthoptist-led programme of pre-school vision screening to check whether children's eyes are developing normally and whether there are any developmental problems that require a more extensive eye test. That is a better screening procedure, but if parents have any worries, they can use the information that we give every parent after the birth of their child to make sure that they follow up any problems. If they are in doubt, they should seek an eye test which, of course, is free.

Tim Loughton: I have to say that that was an extraordinarily complacent answer. If we do not test children's eyesight, how can we know the extent of the problem? There is a poor take-up of eye tests among school-age children, and, after their eight-month check, only 50 per cent. of children have their eyes checked before starting school, so it is more likely that sight defects will emerge as the visual system develops up to the age of seven, which can lead to permanent visual loss and subsequent problems keeping up at school. Why, therefore, did the hon. Lady's Government fail to support Conservative amendments to the Health Bill in another place, which would have ensured that all children receive a proper eye examination before they start school?

Paul Rowen: On 7 June, the Secretary of State said that
	"overspending occurred in better-off areas"—[ Official Report,7 June 2006; Vol. 447, c. 254.]
	Can the Minister explain why the Pennine acute trust, which covers Rochdale, Oldham and north Manchester and has huge health service needs, is predicting an overspend of £28 million, despite, as she said, having balanced its books last year?

Jim Dobbin: The Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust is the second largest hospital trust in the country, serving four district general hospitals and covering 10 constituencies and a population of some 700,000. In addition to the problem highlighted by the hon. Member for Rochdale(Paul Rowen), there are two or three more that need to be considered, including the reconfiguration of that very large trust and board appointments. I want to put on the agenda the independent Appointments Commission and the problems that it is raising in different parts of the country. I should be glad if my hon. Friend expedited the meeting that we have requested for the 10 hon. Members served by the Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust.

Caroline Flint: I think that it does. There is a substantial amount of evidence in that area that underpins the interventions of NHS health trainers. We have "Health Behaviour Change: A Guide for Practitioners" and various other pieces of work. We have had health psychologists in the Department working with us to ask why those most in need of our support are sometimes put off from coming forward to see GPs or others. The initiative is about a practical way to tackle the health inequalities that exist in too many of our communities. So far, it seems to be working well, but, of course, we will evaluate the programme as it develops and expands.

Jeremy Wright: I think the Minister for that answer. He will realise that it is sometimes difficult and expensive for smaller community pharmacies to set up in business. When the review takes place, will heensure that as much help as possible can be given to such pharmacies, perhaps in particular by looking again at the exemptions to the control of entry regulations and allowing pharmacies that comply with those exemptions to open for 80 hours a week, instead of 100 hours, so that people can continue to get their medication from not only supermarkets and large chain pharmacies, but smaller community pharmacies?

Alan Johnson: Protecting children is paramount. In January, my predecessor asked Ofsted to investigate vetting practices in schools, colleges and local authorities. Ofsted has today published its report, which is available in the House of Commons Library. I thank the chief inspector for this thorough and diligent piece of work.
	The report shows that all those involved in the recruitment of staff are committed to child protection, that they almost always demonstrate good practice, and that, crucially, vital checks on prospective employees are being carried out—there were 700,000 last year alone. However, Ofsted is equally clear that not enough is being done in our schools and colleges to keep proper records of what, when and against whom checks are being made. We will act quickly, but carefully, to tackle the failings that Ofsted has identified.
	We are writing to all schools and local authorities today to set out clearly the measures necessary to strengthen the system. Copies of those letters will be placed in the House of Commons Library. I am asking all schools to make sure that they have the records that they need to demonstrate that they have checked the identity, qualifications and any criminal record of their staff. To be absolutely sure that that happens, I will lay regulations to that effect.
	Secure, reliable and up-to-date records must be maintained in an accessible location. If schools do not have a record that a check has been made, a further full Criminal Records Bureau check will have to be conducted and a record kept. My Department and the CRB will work together to ensure that that takes place as speedily as possible. I want similar processes to take place in colleges, so we will work with the Association of Colleges to take that forward. To ensure compliance, Ofsted will check that adequate records and systems are in place as part of its regular school inspection regime.
	Ofsted has also reported that there were complications associated with recruiting teachers from overseas. Head teachers currently seek a certificate of good conduct in addition to proof of qualifications and identity. As Ofsted points out, when there is any doubt, schools err on the side of caution and do not appoint the applicant. That has to be the right approach, but I am announcing today that I will go further than Ofsted recommends and lay regulations to ensure that schools and local authorities also complete a CRB check on all staff recruited from overseas. The procedures for overseas staff must be exactly the same as those for UK-based staff.
	Agency staff also need particular attention. Supply agencies are under a duty to ensure that the staff that they supply are properly checked and suitable to work with children, including CRB and list 99 checks. That should not depend on a request from the school. I am asking for this information on agency staff also to be included in the exercise that each school must undertake to establish clear records. To make all of this clear, we will tighten regulations so that schools are legally required to obtain confirmation from agencies that CRB checks have been carried out, and to keep a record of this, just as they do for permanent staff.
	The Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Bill, currently before the House, will go further still, making it a criminal offence for supply agencies to supply staff without having made the appropriate checks. I know that head teachers already have a very heavy workload, but these are matters that we all agree are paramount. The local safeguarding children boards and directors of children's services will provide schools with local support, ensure that the right training is available and keep the Department informed of progress. I will be more assertive, to use the words of Ofsted, in influencing head teachers and governors to undertake the online safer recruitment training, as Ofsted has recommended.
	The report also says that schools, colleges and local authorities need clearer guidance. We have been preparing revised guidance, which we will put out for consultation in the next few weeks. That will ensure that all schools and colleges have the information in one place. It will make their responsibilities crystal clear, while clarifying issues such as arrangements for employing staff while checks are being completed and processes for volunteer staff, including school governors. We are writing to directors of children's services and the Learning and Skills Council to ensure that this revised guidance is properly implemented.
	I would like to update the House on the list 99 review, following progress since my predecessor, my right hon. Friend the Member for Bolton, West (Ruth Kelly), last made a statement on 1 March. First, I remind the House that she introduced a number of measures in response to public concerns that arose in January. As well as commissioning the Ofsted report that I have just mentioned, she announced that she would make it mandatory for all schools to check all new employees against the CRB; would accept advice from Sir Roger Singleton's panel of experts on decisions to put people on list 99, as a precursor to the independent barring board to be introduced in the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Bill, subject to the will of the House; and would widen list 99s scope, so that anyone convicted of cautioned for a sexual offence against a child would be automatically included on the list, as well as anyone convicted of a serious sexual offence.
	The House will recall that there were a number of cases where Ministers or officials had decided not to include an individual on list 99. I can tell the House that all but one of those has been reassessed by the police as not posing any threat to children. Of the one individual who is being considered further, he has been visited by the police, is not working with children and has not been identified as an immediate cause for concern.
	My right hon. Friend referred also to 32 cases of individuals who were on the sex offenders register, but had not previously been referred to the Department by the police. All of those individuals have now either been, or are being, thoroughly investigated—22 have already been barred and the remaining 10 are still being investigated. They have all been visited by police, are not working with children, and remain subject to the ongoing monitoring that is associated with inclusion on the sex offenders register. Sir Roger Singleton continues with his work, for which I thank him, and I will keep the House updated on progress.
	All Members of the House are equally strongly committed to guarding and protecting our children from those who seek to harm them. We need eternal vigilance to protect children from those whose nature is to manipulate and deceive, and it is our responsibility to ensure that the system is as robust as possible and that any failings are addressed as soon as they are identified.
	With today's changes, the system will be stronger still, producing greater trust and confidence in our schools and colleges, to ensure that our children are safe and secure. Those who we represent expect nothing less.

David Willetts: I welcome the new information from the Secretary of State and the publication of the Ofsted report, which the Government rightly commissioned six months ago. We also welcome the further measures that he is announcing today. However, does he agree that parents have genuine cause for concern from the Ofsted report?
	The report surely shows extraordinarily poor standards of record keeping in our schools, but the problems go way beyond that. Indeed, for the Secretary of State to entitle his statement "School Record Keeping" does not really do justice to the scale of the problem, responsibility for which must be shared throughout the world of education. Local authorities are criticised in the report, and there is clearly an enormous loophole with teacher supply agencies. The report says that
	"in effect, agencies do not have to carry out CRB checks on staff unless schools request that they do. This is not tight enough."
	Incidentally, it is absolutely extraordinary that the Department for Education and Skills, which is dependent now on teacher supply agencies, seems to have no idea how many there are. The report states:
	"The exact number of teacher supply agencies is not known, but one official from the DfES estimated the number to be 300 and another estimated it was 1,500".
	That is surely something that we will wish to pursue on another occasion.
	As well as local authorities and teacher supply agencies, the Department is strongly criticised for unclear and confusing guidance. Let me quote again from the Ofsted report:
	"Recent communications from government clouded matters relating to CRB and there is some confusion. Guidance is not sufficiently comprehensive to give local authorities and schools a clear steer about their respective responsibilities."
	The picture painted by the report is very worrying indeed, yet the previous Secretary of State said:
	"we can give the public an absolute assurance that the process is as robust as possible to ensure that the risk to children is minimised."—[ Official Report, 19 January 2006; Vol. 441, c. 978.]
	Does the Secretary of State agree that his predecessor did not have the information to make that assertion? Does he feel able to repeat that assurance today, in the light of the information in the report? I fear not.
	Of course, we must be careful about how we talk about this very sensitive subject—I know personally of the dangers of vigilantism and lynch mobs because of the notorious riots in 2000 in Portsmouth, which is very close to my constituency—but the only way to restore public confidence in the system is for lessons to be learned. The Secretary of State was quite right that schools must take their responsibilities more seriously. Local authorities must provide clear guidance and support and do their fair share of record keeping. However, whereas the report makes five recommendations for schools and two for local authorities, it makes six for the Department for Education and Skills. Therefore, the Department must take its share of responsibility for the confusion described in the report. It rushed out guidance on 19 January and then issued another letter to clarify that guidance on 26 January—no wonder schools were confused.
	Often in the House, we warn about the dangers of floods of instructions and initiatives from Whitehall. That is not mere political rhetoric—the report shows what happens when schools are deluged with sometimes contradictory guidance. The Department's letter of 19 January listed no fewer than 11 separate items of guidance, dating back to 1996. One of those items in 2002 specifically said that, because of the backlog of cases, teachers could go ahead and recruit staff without the completion of normal checks with the Criminal Records Bureau. That advice was necessary because of a backlog of cases, but may I ask the Secretary of State about his announcement today that schools without proper records will need to do new CRB checks? That could cover 90 per cent. of schools. Can he say how many schools will be affected? Is he confident that the CRB will be able to deliver? He also announced Criminal Records Bureau checks on teachers from abroad. Will he tell us how those checks can be effective in view of the difficulties of obtaining information from some other countries?
	The additional measures that the Secretary of State has announced today are welcome, but does he not recognise the dangers of yet more complexity? What schools need is simple, straightforward, consolidated guidance, instead of having to turn to so many different documents. We will strongly support the Secretary of State if that is what he finally achieves, but is there not a danger of confusing schools with yet more short-term instructions, together with yet more consultation on draft guidance, which will mean schools facing months, if not years, of continuing uncertainty?
	Why has the Department been so slow in implementing the Bichard report, which is two years old this week, especially when we were told two Home Secretaries and two Education Secretaries ago that it would be implemented urgently? What we need above all is a single authoritative list of those not suitable to work with children. Only when that is achieved will the concerns of parents finally be tackled.

Alan Johnson: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his welcome for the report and my statement. I agree that parents should be genuinely concerned about today's report, which I do not think makes comfortable reading. Of course, my predecessor commissioned the report precisely because we wanted to be sure not just that checks were being made, but that there was a clear record of such checks. In that context, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will agree that it is reassuring when Ofsted says that it is "highly likely"—not just probable or likely, but highly likely—that those checks had taken place. The simple fact is—I shall respond to the hon. Gentleman by emphasising that the procedures apply to 100 per cent. of schools—that unless we have a clear record of staff being identified, qualifications being checked and any criminal records being established, we cannot be absolutely sure that all the checks have taken place.
	The hon. Gentleman mentioned agency staff. If I understood him correctly, he was talking about the number of agency staff, but Ofsted referred to the number of agencies and no one was absolutely clear about that. There may be some ambiguity in that agencies spring up all the time. He said that agency staff formed a large proportion of the schoolteacher population. They comprise 3 per cent., of which only 1 per cent. come from the traditional recruitment agencies of local authorities. About 2 per cent. would classify themselves as agency staff, but they are known to the school—perhaps ex-teachers who have retired but called back in—and the school trusts them implicitly. The total is 3 per cent.
	The hon. Gentleman referred to DFES guidance and I completely accept the criticism. We cannot stand at the Dispatch Box and say that it is absolutely right for schools, local authorities and colleges to be criticised, but not the DFES. Six recommendations were made, which the DFES will follow. Some were fairly minuscule—like me being more emphatic or assertive with certain education authorities, which I will be—but others were very serious. The fact that the guidance was not viewed as being clear amounts to a very serious recommendation that we must act upon. I fully accept that.
	I want to make the point that we are talking about a situation of continuous improvement. I accept that there may be a danger of having too many pieces of guidance, which should be brought together. In January, the tremendous concern led to a desperation to act very quickly, but my right hon. Friend the Member for Bolton, West did a tremendous job in just 10 days of putting people's minds at rest. We now have the ability to reflect carefully on the recommendation and try to be clearer in our guidance.
	I have to be clear about another important aspect of schools going through the checks: we are asking for100 per cent. of schools to go through the process. The report showed that in 55 out of 58 schools, records were not kept in an accessible place for Ofsted to see in order to demonstrate that staff had been clearly identified and their qualifications or any criminal record checked. That must now happen. What we are saying to schools is that they may well have that information, but they need to compile it on the register. If the schools do not have the CRB check, the individual teacher or member of staff may have it. The staff will all receive a copy of their CRB check, so the school should ask them for it. If not, perhaps the local authority has it. If they cannot find the CRB check by those methods, they will need to go through the CRB checking procedure again. I realise the amount of work that that will place on schools. We have to do it as quickly as possible, but we must be sure that we do not disrupt the system. Nevertheless, schools, head teachers and everyone in education will agree that that needs to be done. The Ofsted report must be treated seriously, and to do so we must ensure that those records are put in place.

Sarah Teather: I welcome the fact that the Secretary of State has come to the House and made the statement so promptly. I also welcome the Government's decision to set up the Ofsted review, which would inevitably open up the Government to some criticism. It was the right decision and we on the Liberal Benches welcome that. My predecessor, my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Mr. Davey), always tried hard to work constructively with the Government on the issue because it is so sensitive and so difficult. I will try to continue with that tone. However, I have a number of concerns, to which I hope the Secretary of State will respond.
	The right hon. Gentleman recognised the need for consolidated guidance and I hope he will achieve that, but does he recognise that the problem for schools is guidance overload? It can be difficult for schools to discern the difference between new guidance and old guidance that has been updated. In addition to issuing consolidated guidance, as I hope he will, will he look in general at the way in which the Department issues guidance to schools and ensure that it is always clear and that schools can see what is new and what is old?
	The Secretary of State recognised that many supply teachers are provided not through agencies, but through informal contacts with schools because they are retired or because, after an initial contact with an agency, a school may develop a relationship with a particular supply teacher so that they can come in at short notice. Will his guidance deal specifically with that and make it clear who is responsible for ensuring that CRB checks are kept up to date and carried out regularly, particularly for short notice cover?
	The right hon. Gentleman said that he wanted existing regulations to apply also to further education colleges. That is to be welcomed, especially as I hope that the Government will encourage more young people to use the services offered by FE colleges, but that opens up a gap in the system. Will he be clear that the regulations will apply to both teaching and non-teaching staff at colleges, as already happens with schools, and that the CRB checks required will be enhanced, not just basic? There appears to be a discrepancy with the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Bill, and I should be grateful if the Secretary of State would look into the matter.
	The Ofsted report highlighted ambiguities in the way in which guidance is issued to schools which control their own employment practice, such as foundation and academy schools. Will the guidance make it clear who is responsible for checking foundation or trust-appointed governors? As we heard when we debated the Education and Inspections Bill, the Charity Commission is responsible for CRB checks on trustees for new trust schools, but who will be responsible for ensuring that those checks are kept up to date and carried out regularly? That is not clear.
	Very large numbers of people are likely to come on to a school campus to provide out-of-school clubs under the extended schools programme. Who will be responsible for undertaking CRB checks and who will pay for them—the school or the voluntary group? What support will head teachers get to help them to cope with the enormous increase in the burden of paperwork for those schools?
	Lastly, Ofsted highlighted difficulties for head teachers in reporting soft information about staff causing concern, because of employment law. It is right that head teachers should be cautious about that. What changes will the Government make to the system to boost confidence and make sure that delicate and difficult information is passed on correctly so that it can be used appropriately?
	We will make every effort to work constructively with the Government and I hope they will be open with us at all stages about the information that they have.

Alan Johnson: I thank the hon. Lady for her constructive approach, which the hon. Member for Havant(Mr. Willetts) also adopted. Consolidated guidance would be excellent, and I will do everything that I can to ensure that we have not only clear guidance, but consolidated guidance. The teaching unions to which I have already spoken are concerned that teachers are getting so much guidance that it is difficult to keep up, which was also an implied criticism made by Ofsted.
	The responsibility for CRB checks in foundation schools, voluntary aided schools and voluntary controlled schools always comes back to the school. A local authority might make checks, too—it has a responsibility to keep proper records—but that does not detract from the belt-and-braces approach by which the school should make sure that a proper check has taken place. The school is where parents will ask teachers and head teachers for reassurance and where Ofsted will conduct its inspection, and the matter comes down to the school on every occasion.
	I will look into the point about colleges—I think that an enhanced CRB check is required, but I will write to the hon. Lady because there are complications around colleges that do not exist in schools. Similarly, the provision on extended schools was a specific recommendation by Ofsted, which we need to examine, but it seems to me that the responsibility for CRB checks once again lies with the school, although providers of services in the extended hours will have an equal responsibility. Nevertheless, Ofsted has highlighted that point and we need to respond to it.

Alan Johnson: The right hon. Gentleman raises an important and difficult issue. Twenty-one countries are part of the Criminal Records Bureau wider international check—the overseas information service. Fortunately, among those 21 are seven of the eight countries that give us the most teachers, including South Africa, New Zealand and Australia. Curiously, America is not one of them. That allows for a checking mechanism. The certificate of good conduct is a method that has been used, but Ofsted has found a couple of cases involving local authorities where those records were not as stringent as they should have been. We need to work harder in these areas. Ofsted said that everyone to whom they spoke errs on the side of caution. That is absolutely right. There need to be identity checks on overseas staff, whichever country they come from, to be absolutely sure that they are who they say they are and that their qualifications are accurate. They will now have to undergo the CRB check. In several countries, records are not good. We need to work more closely with the Home Office and the Foreign Office, and with our international partners in the European Union and elsewhere, to ensure that we get this right. It is a reciprocal process, because British and UK people go abroad to teach, and everyone needs to be assured that there are proper checks.

Nick Herbert: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Yesterday at Home Office questions, I asked the Home Secretary whether he had read a report by the head of finance of the Association of Chief Police Officers, which warns that police force amalgamations will contribute to a funding gap equivalent to the loss of 25,000 police officers. The Home Secretary replied that he had not read the report, but that he had
	"discussed it in detail with the authors".—[ Official Report,19 June 2006; Vol. 447, c. 1061.]
	He also said that the example that I had given was the "worst and most extreme" option. The author of the report is Dr. Tim Brain, the chief constable of Gloucestershire, who yesterday confirmed that at no time has the Home Secretary discussed the report with him. Indeed, he has not met the Home Secretary. He also confirmed that the figure of 25,000 police officer losses cannot be regarded as worst case.
	Mr. Speaker, the Home Secretary has already had to apologise to you and to the House for providing misleading information relating to foreign national prisoners. He has also made the extraordinary concession to the Leader of the House that Home Office answers are not always factual. I appreciate that the Home Secretary's serial incompetence is not a matter for you, Mr. Speaker, but is it not a serious matter when he, even inadvertently, misrepresents a report that is of the greatest concern to all hon. Members and our constituents? Will you offer him an opportunity to come to the House to correct his mistake?

Annette Brooke: We are back here discussing these matters after a three-month gap. That is a long time and I am not sure why we had such a long break from our deliberations on the Bill. We discussed new clause 3 briefly in Committee in a clause stand part debate. The new clause was not actually tabled, and I wanted to revisit it to ensure that all the issues were covered.
	In Committee, we learned that only about 300 international adoptions a year involved the United Kingdom. The new clause refers to something even more unusual: foreign adoptions of United Kingdom children. It is supported by both the British Association for Adoption and Fostering and the Intercountry Adoption Centre. In Committee, I said that I firmly believed that the child's interests should be paramount. In her response, the Minister said
	"we have come to the settled position that the 10-week provision is right, striking the balance between safeguarding children and having a requirement for adopters".—[ Official Report, Standing Committee B, 14 March 2006; c. 38.]
	I respect that as a general position, but feel that there should be discretion to take into account special circumstances that, in some cases, might lead to a different judgment in relation to the child's best interests. As some of us will argue later this afternoon, the child's best interests must be served by examination of each individual case. That is what the new clause attempts to secure.
	Section 84 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 provides for the High Court to be able to make an order granting parental responsibility to applicants who are not domiciled or habitually resident in the United Kingdom when they wish to take a child out of the country for the purpose of adoption. Section 84(4) imposes a requirement for the child to have lived with the applicants for at least 10 weeks before an application may be made under the section. A similar provision in section 46 prescribes various minimum periods for which the child must have lived with the applicants before an application may be made for an adoption order, but the section also allows for the court to give leave for some applications to be made before the usual period has expired. The requirement for the 10-week minimum period is of course designed to safeguard the child, and to ensure that the child and adopters have time to become acquainted with each other before the jurisdiction. However, as the applicants will by definition be habitually resident in another country, it will often be not merely difficult but impossible for them to live in this country for a minimum period of 10 weeks with the child before making an application, possibly having to remain here for still longer pending the outcome of the application.
	It is most likely that, when someone wants to adopt overseas a child from this country, there will already be some connection; probably, but not necessarily, a blood relationship. In some circumstances, the child may already be well acquainted with the proposed adopters—for example, having spent holidays with them—but the existing provision in the Adoption and Children Act does not allow any flexibility or exercise of discretion. The new clause and amendments would allow flexibility, but permit rules of court to provide further safeguards if that were thought necessary.
	It is important to bear it in mind that section 84 applications can in any event only be made in the High Court. It is not suggested that a final order under section 84 should be made before the child has lived with the applicants for at least the 10 weeks required, nor that it would always be appropriate or helpful for the child to be permitted to leave the country with the prospective adopters without a period of living with them. But if the court is to be able to achieve the outcome that best meets the child's needs, it is essential that it can consider all the circumstances and form a view on whether sufficient other safeguards are in place to permit the child to leave the jurisdiction. Without that, some children may be deprived of the possibility of secure family life with members of their extended family, or with adopters who share aspects of their heritage and culture, given that the 10 weeks may constitute an impossible barrier in some cases. I do not believe that it should be waived solely on the ground that it is an insurmountable barrier, but we need flexibility in such situations to make sure that the child's interests are best served.
	In most cases, a child would be placed overseas with someone related by blood, but in others the child would be placed with a person living abroad who was not a close relative. For example, the restriction on removing a child under section 85 of the 2002 Act applies to any child who is a Commonwealth citizen or habitually resident in the UK. The legislation that applied before the 2002 Act was introduced imposed a similar restriction in respect of children who were British or Irish citizens. Some children may be habitually resident in this country who not only are nationals of another country but have strong links with that country. For them, it would be most appropriate to be adopted in that other country.
	In other cases, according to the BAAF, a local authority has tried to place a child with a family who have already adopted his or her older sibling but who have moved abroad. In extremely rare cases, the risks posed by a birth parent may be so great that one reason for seeking a placement outside UK jurisdiction is to ensure the safety of the child and of the proposed adopters. In proposing new clause 3, I am asking not for anything absolute but for flexibility, so that judgments made in the High Court are in the child's best interests.
	I am sure that the Conservative spokesman will present the arguments for the remaining amendments in the group in great detail, but I want to place it on record that my party is broadly supportive of all of them. As I said in Committee, I am sure that every politician and member of the general public is concerned about trafficking in children and other unethical practices, but we must also consider the plight of children in some countries in the developing world. We must focus on the welfare of the child and have regard to the UN convention on the rights of the child, so that the best interests of the child can be served. That may be achieved by allowing the child to live with a family in this country.
	It is easy to understand and support the action that the Government have taken on Cambodia, but the remaining amendments in the group would help to provide a more balanced approach. In no way do they run counter to the best interests of the child, and their arguments for an appeals process, a review and recourse to The Hague convention seem compelling.
	Today, I read again the  Hansard report of our Committee proceedings, and I note that the Minister made various pledges to provide more information on the very high cost of overseas adoption. I hope that the House can be updated on when that information might be available, if is not so already.

Tim Loughton: As the hon. Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole (Annette Brooke) said, here we are again, at last—almost three months after we ended our discussion of the Bill in Committee. However, we are now able to deal with the large amount of business that was left unfinished then.
	I have a deal of sympathy with new clause 3. Many technical deficiencies have emerged from the woodwork since the Adoption and Children Act 2002 came into force. We all supported that very comprehensive legislation, but the Government would do well to address some of the implications that have flowed from it. One area of difficulty arises from the problems with placing a UK child with adopters—such as suitable relatives, for example—in another country, where that is in the best interests of the child. However, to meet the terms of the 2002 Act, families may be required to spend as much as several months in the UK. That would appear to be excessive, and not in the interests of the child. That would be wholly impractical for some prospective adopting families from overseas who had work commitments or other children at school in their home country, so I certainly have some sympathy for the hon. Lady's proposal. I shall be interested to hear the Government's response and to learn whether they acknowledge that there is a genuine problem and whether they are prepared to accept the new clause or to revisit the problem, perhaps in regulation if that is possible.
	Similar problems have emerged for British expatriate workers who adopt while they are in China. I do not know whether the Minister has been lobbied on the matter, as I have; my letter to her former colleague remains unanswered. The British adoption support group for China has been formed to deal with the problem that the Chinese authorities apparently require the British Government, through the Department for Education and Skills, to issue an approval letter to all prospective adopters to guarantee that the adopted children will be granted citizenship and UK passports. I think that is quite right, but the Department for Education and Skills will grant approval letters only to adoption applications filed by UK-registered adoption agencies and local councils, to which expats have no access because they are obviously not habitually resident inthe UK while they are working overseas. In the spirit of the new clause, will the Minister undertake to look at the problem and, at the very least, to reply to my letter, which is now more than two months old? I know that she has received direct representations from expats working in China who have come up against that problem.
	The other amendments are familiar to Members who were in Committee. Amendment No. 2 deals with the procedures whereby the Secretary of State can seek to suspend inter-country adoptions from a particular country. We agreed with that proposal in Committee; it is a tightening up exercise that the Secretary of State already has power to institute, but the amendment would bring the process into mainstream legislation and make it easier for the Secretary of State to take action where it is deemed that a country's procedures for adoption fall well short of the expected standards. There may be suspicions of child trafficking, for example, as was the case with Cambodia, which is one country—if not the only one—on the suspended list for inter-country adoption.
	There is some merit in our status, and that of several other countries, as signatories to the Hague conference convention. The amendment would cover countries that have signed up to the rules set out in the convention and that should, therefore, be entitled to be subject to a slightly different process. For some reason, the Minister has declined to respond to that suggestion in the past, asserting:
	"There may be situations where a requirement to consult could have unfortunate implications for the welfare of those children by triggering a rush to adopt."
	However, inter-country adoption is, by its very nature, a slow, cumbersome and often expensive process for most adoptive parents, so that fear is rather overdone. Surely, as part of the process, we should have as much openness as possible about the fact that suspension is being considered, allowing adopters going through the process to make alternative arrangements or to reconsider their application. It would be helpful to include in the Bill a provision that a convention country and its authorities should be one of the statutory consultees.
	Amendment No. 1, too, deals with the process used to put a country on the banned list. I am sure that we all agree that, before banning or suspending a country from inter-country adoptions, the Government should consult all interested parties as widely as possible. As well as the Department of Health in the UK and the Welsh Assembly, as stipulated in the Bill, the Government should speak to the relevant body or Government Department in the country that is to be placed on the suspended list. The Bill is deficient, as it fails to make that requirement. What is the Government's interpretation of the phrase, "contrary to public policy", in clause 9? Proper and transparent consultation is required if we are to suspend countries for the right reasons. We must monitor their suspension and make sure that prospective adoptive parents who are trying to adopt in that country are kept in the loop and informed of their entitlements.
	It is a big step to put a country on the suspended list, as that prevents UK citizens from adopting children from that country. Cambodia, for example, has about 670,000 orphans under 18, which is 5 per cent. of its population. Some 30,000 of those orphans are children under 15 who are orphaned by AIDS. The UK has a role to play adopting children who cannot find suitable homes in their own country, so it was a big decision to add Cambodia to the suspended list, just as it will be a big decision to add other countries in future. The process must be clear, transparent and properly accountable.
	Amendment No. 22, too, deals with the process for keeping countries on the suspended list. It stipulates that there should be regular reviews of the reasons for the regulation of a suspended country to determine whether they still apply. We teased out a little detail from the Government on Report, but we need to know how much evidence they require to prove that the system in a prospective country for adoption is not working properly and that child trafficking, not genuine adoption, is taking place. What burdens and parameters of proof will be set? At what stage will a potential adopter be forced to abort the process of adoption from a country that is added to the list, and when can it be resumed if that country is removed from the list? Again, transparency is required if we are to make sure that everyone is happy and satisfied that the Government have taken appropriate action.
	The penultimate amendment in this group is amendment No. 4, which stipulates:
	"The Secretary of State must establish an appeals procedure to consider appeals against the decision to impose special restrictions on adoptions from abroad."
	Clause 9(9) says:
	"The restricted list and the reasons are to be published in whatever way the Secretary of State thinks appropriate for bringing them to the attention of adoption agencies and members of the public."
	We have granted the Secretary of State an enormous blank cheque, as the provision does not specify how he will make that decision, how it will be communicated and consulted on, and how it can be reversed if the situation changes. It is therefore right to have proper checks and balances in the Bill and to establish the appeals procedure that amendment No. 4 seeks. The Bill must establish an appeals procedure to consider appeals against decisions to suspend, and against decisions not to permit individual applications to proceed, thereby ensuring transparency in all aspects of the decision-making process. It should be possible to bring together a group of people—independent of the Government, the agency and the applicants—with the relevant knowledge and expertise to form a properly constituted, working appeals procedure. We have raised this issue in Committee, but I hope that the Government will respond more favourably at this stage.
	Finally, I turn to amendment No. 23, which would require the review process to include prescribed organisations. The Bill stipulates that the Government should consult only the National Assembly for Wales and Government Departments in Northern Ireland. But as we said in Committee, there is a whole host of other agencies and organisations in the UK involved with adoption—headed by the British Association for Adoption and Fostering, with which we and the Government are well familiar—that have something to say, rightly, and a good deal of expertise that needs to be consulted.
	We need to make sure that, if these important decisions are to be made barring adoptions from certain countries, they are taken on the basis of considerations that are entirely dictated by the welfare of the children involved, and not on the basis of political considerations or of the state of diplomatic relations with certain countries. They must be based purely on what is in the best interests of the children who are prospectively to be adopted. That is why we are asking for a wider remit to consult other organisations whose only interest is promoting the cause of adoption for children for whom adoption is in their best interests, and which are without any political slant or international prejudices that might colour the Secretary of State's decision.
	The five amendments in my name and of other Opposition Members are constructive amendments aimed at improving the nature of this part of the Bill, which we support and have done all along. We are trying to put more detail in the Bill, which should provide more safeguards for those involved in the international adoption process, in the interests of transparency and fairness and ultimately, therefore, of the children whom this part of the Bill is all about.

Parmjit Dhanda: This group of amendments seeks further clarification on our proposals for inter-country adoption and I welcome the opportunity to provide it. The amendments cover a wide range of related topics, including the process for imposing special restrictions on particular countries, the determination of the fee for inter-country adoption casework—although that issue has not been touched on in our debates, it is dealt with in the amendments—and arrangements for safeguarding children adopted abroad from this country. They raise different issues, and I will try to deal with each in turn.
	As they stand, sections 84 and 85 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 prevent children from being removed from this country for the purposes of adoption abroad unless certain conditions have been met. The aim of those provisions is to help to prevent the abduction of, and trafficking in, children, and to ensure the development by affected children of secure attachments with their prospective future legal parent. I am sure that Members will agree that we should do nothing to weaken that safeguard unless we are satisfied that it is absolutely necessary to do so.
	New clause 3 would allow the current minimum cohabitation period of 10 weeks to be waived, as the hon. Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole (Annette Brooke) said. I did not serve on the Standing Committee, but the hon. Lady did, and I am sure that she will recall that we explained the rationale behind the requirement for an appropriate period of cohabitation in section 84 and why that means that the period of cohabitation must take place in the United Kingdom. However, I shall briefly rehearse some of that rationale.
	Until an order is made under section 84, the local authority retains parental responsibility for the child, and hence remains responsible for the child. In the parallel situation of a domestic adoption, no application for an adoption order may be made unless the child has been living with the prospective adopters for 10 weeks. A similar requirement therefore applies to applications for an order under section 84, which allows the local authority to monitor and assess the placement and to step in immediately and directly if there are any problems. That is part of our reason for not wanting the 10-week period to be waived. Obviously, the local authority would not be able to monitor or take action as directly or as immediately if the child were outside the UK. The requirements in section 84 therefore give the same safeguards and protection to children placed with prospective adopters who intend to adopt the child outside the UK as are given to children placed with domestic adopters.
	Various reports and information must be made available to the court when considering an order under section 84, including reports and information arising from a review of the placement. It is important that the court has information on the success, or otherwise, of the placement before making an order that authorises the prospective adopters to remove the child from the country, and to distance the child, in every sense, from its birth family. The proposed measure would limit the information available to the court, and a report of the assessment of the placement is a significant, if not pivotal, piece of information.
	Having carefully considered the arguments previously put on this issue, we continue to believe that it would not be appropriate to water down such an important safeguard. There can be no justification for a lower standard of safeguarding for children placed for adoption outside this country than applies for domestic adoptions. We therefore do not support the new clause. I understand that last December the period in question was six months, and it has subsequently been reduced; it is now 10 weeks. We feel that that is appropriate and proportionate, and we do not as yet have any evidence to the contrary, although we would always consider such evidence, if it were offered.
	Amendment No. 1 would require the Secretary of State to consult
	"the central authority in the country or territory to which restrictions are to apply"
	before making a declaration. The Hague convention requires contracting states to designate at least one central authority to discharge functions in respect of inter-country adoption. As it stands, clause 9 requires the Secretary of State to consult the devolved Administrations in Wales and Northern Ireland before making a declaration of special restrictions. Adoption is a devolved policy area, and that requirement is entirely reasonable, as a declaration will have a direct effect on those countries. Such consultations are undertaken relatively often and are not a significant cause of delay.
	One of the concerns that caused us to introduce the Bill is child trafficking, which appears often to be fuelled and assisted by corruption and improper financial gain. That was one of the specific areas of concern that led to the introduction of a temporary suspension of adoptions from Cambodia, which I know was thoroughly discussed in Committee. Sadly, corruption and the lure of improper financial gain will be present in some countries that may be placed on the restricted list at all levels up to, and including, the central authority. Indeed, in some cases the central authority could even be the main cause of such problems.
	In such circumstances, consulting the central authority could pose significant risks to children by triggering a rush—the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) mentioned this—to process adoptions much more quickly, before the special restrictions are introduced. We are not suggesting that that will be a feature of all situations where a country is placed on the restricted list. Indeed, information gathered from the central authority may be of significant value in a number of cases. However, a requirement in primary legislation to consult in each and every case is clearly not appropriate, so I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will understand that we cannot accept the amendment.
	Amendment No. 2 would require the Secretary of State to consult the Hague conference on private international law before making an order to impose special restrictions on a country that had ratified or acceded to the Hague convention. I assume that the intention is for the Secretary of State to consultthe permanent bureau, which acts as the secretariat to the Hague conference, rather than the 65 member states that make up the conference. When concerns are raised regarding a Hague convention country, they should indeed be raised with the permanent bureau, which would generally expect to act as a mediator to help to resolve the situation. It can and does do that. In 2003, the permanent bureau convened a meeting of contracting states to discuss with Guatemala how concerns about adoptions from that country could be addressed.
	We have a good working relationship with the permanent bureau and we understand that it would both expect and—importantly—be happy to be consulted. I can therefore reassure the hon. Gentleman that amendment No. 2 is not necessary, because we already use the mechanisms of co-operation managed by the permanent bureau. However, for the same reason that relates to amendment No. 1, there may conceivably be cases in which we will need to act quickly and do not want to risk the delay of consulting the permanent bureau. We would therefore not want a statutory obligation to consult in all cases—in case one of those exceptional circumstances should come about.
	Amendment No. 4 would require the Secretary of State to establish a procedure to consider appeals against the decision to introduce special restrictions. It is only right that there are appropriate checks and balances on the powers of the Secretary of State, but I can assure the hon. Gentleman that they are in place without the need for the amendment. First, following the recommendation of the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, clause 9(4) was amended to provide that the Secretary of State's declaration that special restrictions will apply shall be made by order. That means that the order that declares that special restrictions are to apply is subject to the usual parliamentary scrutiny and could be annulled under the negative procedure in Parliament.
	Secondly, when special restrictions are in place, it would also be open to anyone to make representations to the Secretary of State, which he would have a duty to consider. Clause 10 requires the Secretary of State to keep the special restrictions under review and, if he no longer has concerns over practices in the relevant country in connection with adoption, the restrictions must be removed. The consideration of representations would form part of the review of a restricted country and consideration of its removal from the restricted list. Thirdly, the introduction of special restrictions is an administrative decision made by the Secretary of State and, as such, will be subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. Application for a judicial review is therefore also available as a course for challenging the Secretary of State's decision to introduce special restrictions. As we know, that has happened; there has been a challenge in the past.
	Clause 11 already provides a mechanism for individual prospective adopters to argue that their application should proceed, despite the special restrictions. Cases will be decided on their merits after consideration of the prevailing circumstances and the best interests of the child concerned. Several examples of that were fleshed out in Committee. Given all the protections that are in place, there is no need to add a statutory framework for appeals.
	I am happy to say that amendment No. 22, which would require regular reviews of decisions to impose special restrictions, is not necessary. Clause 10(1) will explicitly require the Secretary of State to keep under review whether any country on the restricted list should remain as such.

Tim Loughton: Yes, clause 10(1) will indeed oblige the Secretary of State to keep the matter under review, but it will not oblige him to publish his findings. Wedo not know the form that the internal review might take. We are trying to make the point through the amendment that a much more transparent system is needed so that people who wished to adopt, or whose prospective adoption was interrupted by a suspension process, could be kept fully in the loop. The amendment would mean that everyone could be assured that the reasons for suspending a country were valid while the suspension was in place.

Parmjit Dhanda: The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point. It is in the interests of the Secretary of State and all of us to ensure that these matters are in the public domain and are fleshed out as far as possible. The Bill's provisions are sufficiently strong for us not to require anything further in statute. The hon. Gentleman asked a specific question about China, to which I will ensure that he gets a quick response. I understand that the Department for Education and Skills has been in dialogue with its Chinese counterparts and we are hoping for a conclusion to be reached sooner rather than later.
	Amendment No. 23 would require that before revoking a declaration of special restrictions, the Secretary of State would have to consult prescribed organisations involved in adoption, as well as colleagues in Wales and Northern Ireland. As I have said already, there are good administrative reasons why consultation with the devolved Administrations is appropriate when making or revoking declarations of special restrictions. There might well be occasions when organisations involved in adoption that might know something about the circumstances in the relevant country would be consulted before revoking a declaration, but that will not be necessary in every case, so we should not put a blanket provision in the Bill. There is a commitment that such consultation will take place when we can glean additional information that will give us more knowledge of what is happening on the ground to assist the Secretary of State to make a decision.
	As I said at the outset, I am grateful to the hon. Members for Mid-Dorset and North Poole and for East Worthing and Shoreham for giving me the opportunity to clarify our position on an important, yet not uncomplicated, set of provisions. I hope that I have been able to offer sufficient reassurance about our intention to be transparent, which is especially important in this area of work, and our use of the provisions. We will be guided at all times by the objective of safeguarding children, which we all support. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole will withdraw the new clause.

Annette Brooke: I will not press new clause 3 to a Division. I take heart from the Minister saying that the matter can be kept under review because I am sure that if the appropriate agencies have such evidence as is feared, they will feel that they will be able to contact the Minister directly. I am not entirely convinced that the transparency and openness will be as great as Opposition Members would like, but, with those few comments, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
	 Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: New clause 9— Reasonable contact: no order principle—
	'After section 1(5) of the Children Act 1989 (c. 41) insert—
	"(6) The "no order" principle in section 5 shall be construed subject to section 1A of this Act whereby it shall be presumed that making an order for reasonable contact with the parents is, in the absence of good reason to the contrary, better for the child than making no order at all."'.
	New clause 11— Provision as to family assistance orders—
	'In the circumstances where a family assistance order is made, the officer concerned will proceed on the presumption that the child's interests are best served through reasonable contact with both his parents unless good reason to the contrary is shown.'.
	New clause 12— Reasonable contact: welfare checklist—
	'After section 1(3)(g) of the Children Act 1989 (c. 41) insert—
	"(h) the desirability of reasonable contact between the child and the non-resident parent in the absence of good reason to the contrary." '.
	New clause 13— Presumption of reasonable contact—
	'After section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989 (c. 41) insert—
	"(1A) In respect of subsection 1(1) above and subject to the welfare of the child, the court shall act on the presumption that the child's interests are best served through reasonable contact with both his parents in the absence of good reason to the contrary." '.
	New clause 16— Extended family: desirability of contact—
	'After section 5 of the Children Act 1989 (c. 41) insert—
	"5A Extended family: desirability of contact
	(1) Where an order with respect to a child is made by the court the court must take into account the desirability of contact between the child and his extended family.
	(2) Subsection (1) will not be taken into account by a court if it conflicts with any welfare requirements in Section 1."'.
	New clause 17— Non-resident parents—
	'After section 1(3)(g) of the Children Act 1989 (c. 41) insert—
	"(h) the importance of sustaining a relationship between the child and a non-residential parent." '.
	New clause 18— Statutory objectives—
	'(1) In discharging their respective functions in connection with any proceedings in which the court is considering whether to make provision about contact with a child—
	(a) the court;
	(b) the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service; and
	(c) the parties' legal representatives (if any)
	must, so far as is reasonably possible, act in a way that is compatible with the objectives set out in subsection (2).
	(2) The objectives under subsection (1) are—
	(a) the welfare of the child;
	(b) reduction of the risk of harm;
	(c) reasonable contact; and
	(d) post separation parenting.
	(3) The welfare of the child applies in all respects as set out in section 1 of the Children Act 1989.
	(4) "Reduction of the risk of harm" means that the safety of children and other persons involved in contact arrangements should be assessed and planned for and the danger of violence should be minimised.
	(5) "Reasonable contact" means the promotion of ongoing contact between a child and his parents and other family members to an extent that is reasonable having regard to the facts of the individual case.
	(6) In having regard to post separation parenting the court, the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service and the parties' legal representatives (if any) shall promote the desirability of co-operation between parents in the making of arrangements for any child contact.
	(7) In applying these objectives the court, the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service and the parties' legal representatives (if any) shall have regard to the contribution that mediation may make to achieving them.'.
	New clause 19— Applications for contact orders (grandparents and family carers)—
	'(1) In the event of an application to a court for an order permitting contact with a child by—
	(a) a grandparent of the child; or
	(b) a relative with whom the child has lived for a period of at least one year,
	the application may be made without the leave of the court.
	(2) The period of one year mentioned in subsection (1) need not be continuous but must not have begun more than three years before, or ended more than three months before, the making of the application.
	(3) The Secretary of State may by regulation amend section 10 of the Children Act 1989 in accordance with the provisions of subsections (1) and (2).'.
	New clause 24— Presumption of reasonable contact in the absence of good reason to the contrary—
	'After section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989 (c.41) insert—
	"(1A) In respect of subsection 1(1) above, subject to good reason to the contrary and where the safety of the child is not an issue, the court shall act on the presumption that the child's interests are best served through reasonable contact with both of his parents whether or not he is resident with either parent.
	(1B) In determining what "reasonable contact" is in respect of subsection (1A) the court shall have regard to the desirability of—
	(a) contact facilitating a positive and fulfilling relationship between the parent and the child;
	(b) frequent contact;
	(c) contact lasting for lengthy time periods;
	(d) contact with siblings; and
	(e) contact with extended family."'.
	New clause 25— Default contact arrangements—
	'Schedule (New Schedule 1) (which makes provision for default contact arrangements) has effect.'.
	New schedule 1— Default contact arrangements—
	1 (1) This Schedule applies where two persons having parental responsibility for a child under the age of14 years are at the commencement of this Act living or thereafter commence to live in separate households from each other.
	(2) In this Schedule the "resident parent" means that person with parental responsibility for a child specified under sub-paragraph (1) who is principally resident in the same household as the child; the "non-resident parent" shall mean the other person, with whom the child does not reside.
	(3) The provisions of this Schedule are entirely without prejudice to the responsibility of the resident and non-resident parents in any case to which this Schedule applies to make such agreed arrangements for contact with the child as they may decide are appropriate in the child's best interests.
	(4) In any case to which this Schedule applies in it shall be the responsibility of both the resident and the non-resident parents—
	(a) to endeavour to reach agreement as to such arrangements for contact or,
	(b) if they are to give effect to the default contact arrangements set out in paragraph 4 below, to endeavour—
	(i) to ensure that the default contact arrangements operate smoothly;
	(ii) to reach agreement as to the detailed implementation of the default contact arrangements; and
	(iii) to reach agreement as to such variations to the default contact arrangements with regard to dates, times and delivery and collection arrangements as may be appropriate to suit the circumstances and commitments of the child, any sibling of the child, the resident parent and the non-resident parent.
	(5) On any application to a court for contact with any child the way in which the resident and non-resident parent have each discharged the responsibility set out in paragraph 1(4) shall be a circumstance which it shall be relevant for the court to consider.
	2 In any case where the resident parent and the non-resident parent commence living in separate households after the commencement of this Act they shall be deemed to have agreed upon such separation to the arrangements for contact between the child and the non-resident parent set out in paragraph 4 below ("the default contact arrangements") and such arrangements shall be put into effect from the date of such separation unless and until either—
	(a) the resident parent and the non-resident parent have agreed alternative arrangements for such contact; or
	(b) a court otherwise orders.
	3 In any case where the resident parent and the non-resident parent are already living in separate households at the commencement of this Act they shall be deemed to have agreed at the date of such commencement to the arrangements for contact between the child and the non-resident parent set out in paragraph 4 below ("the default contact arrangements") and such arrangements shall be put into effect unless and until either—
	(a) the resident parent and the non-resident parent have agreed alternative arrangements for such contact; or
	(b) a court otherwise orders.
	4 The default contact arrangements to which paragraphs 2 and 3 above refer shall be as follows—
	(1) In the case of an infant under one year old, the child shall visit the non-resident parent every Sunday between 9 a.m. and5 p.m.; and the resident and non-resident parents shall share responsibility for transport of the child between their homes.
	(2) In the case of any child who has attained the age of one year but is not yet in full-time education, the child shall—
	(a) stay with the non-resident parent on alternate weekends from 10 a.m. on Saturday until 5 p.m. on Sunday;
	(b) visit the non-resident parent from 2 p.m. until 5 p.m. every Wednesday;
	(c) stay with the non-resident parent for seven weeks' holiday per year, on dates to be agreed between the resident and non-resident parents or, in default of such an agreement, determined by a court; and
	(d) the resident and non-resident parents shall share responsibility for transport of the child between their homes.
	(3) In the case of any child in full-time education who has not yet attained the age of fourteen years, the child shall—
	(a) stay with the non-resident parent on alternate weekends from after the child finishes school on Friday until 6 p.m. on Sunday;
	(b) visit the non-resident parent from 4 p.m. until 6 p.m. every Wednesday;
	(c) stay with the non-resident parent for seven weeks' holiday per year, of which at least ten days shall be in the Christmas school holidays, ten days shall be in the Easter school holidays; and the balance in the summer school holidays, the precise dates to be agreed between the resident and non-resident parents or, in default of such agreements, determined by a court; and
	(d) the resident and non-resident parents shall share responsibility for transport of the child between their homes and/or the child's school.
	5 This Schedule shall not apply in circumstances where allegations of child abuse are made in such form as the Secretary of State may by order prescribe.'.

Tim Loughton: We come to the guts of the main part of the Bill. In the absence of any signs to the contrary, I shall speak, first, generally to the thrust of the new clauses before going into detail.
	New clause 4 goes to the heart of the principle that we think should be set out in the Bill. If the Government agree to the principle that is enshrined in the new clause, they would, at a stroke, remove the major objections to why the Bill, in its current form, will not work and why it will prove to be a damp squib, as we have warned all along. The principle is clear: it is that a child's welfare and interests are best served by both his parents being as actively involved in his upbringing as possible unless there are good reasons to the contrary that pose a risk to the safety of that child. That rider runs through every amendment that the Opposition have tabled to the Bill throughout all stages of its consideration.
	The new clause and the associated new clauses are not about parents' rights. We have not once addressed the Bill in terms of parents' rights. The new clauses are not about treating a child as some accessory or commodity whose ownership should be tightly defined and whose diary should be artificially prescribed on a rota basis between each of his parents. The new clauses are not about compromising the paramountcy of the welfare of the child as set out in section 1 of the Children Act 1989, some 17 years ago. That piece of legislation is as relevant and valued today as it was when it was when first debated in the House.
	Surely a child's welfare is best served by maximising the time—preferably quality time—that is spent with both his parents. That is complementary to, and not contradictory to, the paramountcy of the welfare of that child. The new clauses represent none of the things that they have at times been caricatured to represent by the Minister and her predecessor, who was guaranteed to launch into a frenzy every time the issue of co-parenting was mentioned.

Tim Loughton: I appreciate the hon. Lady's point. I appreciate also her longstanding interest in and great involvement with this piece of legislation at all stages. However, what she is suggesting would be rather more prescriptive. What we have put in the new clause is broad ranging. It sets down a principle that can be applied to other aspects of the Bill.
	I do not want to say that a child should spend three days with one parent and four days with the other, or vice versa, or any computation of that. We have never once tried to do that. That would be extremely prescriptive. New clause 4 and the other similar new clauses set out the principle that should be applied throughout this legislation and which should be used to amend the Children Act 1989. It underlines the fact that it is in the best interests of the child to spend as much quality time as possible with each of the parents. As new clause 4 says, those parents should be
	"as fully and equally involved in his parenting as possible."
	In using the word "equally", we are in no way trying to prescribe that they should spend 50 per cent. of the time with their children. That would be absolutely wrong; it would not be a reflection of real life, as the hon. Member for Stockport (Ann Coffey) will know from her experience and as I do from mine. I am afraid that there is no way that I spend 50 per cent. of the time, divided between myself and my wife, with my children, regretfully. That is the nature of hon. Members' jobs, and it is the same for many other people's jobs. To try to replicate a 50:50 division of time after a couple had split up would not properly reflect the nature of a parent's relationship with a child when a couple is together in a united family. We have been at great pains to try to ensure that new clause 4 is not prescriptive, but it is fundamental to the principle behind our whole approach to the Bill.

David Taylor: The early-day motion on parenting time presumption, tabled by the right hon. Member for Maidenhead(Mrs. May), goes to the root of the issue and has received extensive cross-party support. I welcome the new clause, but would the hon. Gentleman not acknowledge that the use of the word "equal" will, no doubt, allow various debates to ensue? Would not a word such as "comparable" give a more appropriate impression of what he is trying to achieve?

Tim Loughton: I welcome the hon. Gentleman's involvement in the discussion and the fact that he is one of the 116 Labour signatories who have made early-day motion 128—tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs. May), myself and other hon. Members—one of the top three most supported early-day motions in this Parliament. Before I come to that subject, I want to refer to his mention of the word "equal". We do not talk about equality in that respect; we use the phrase
	"as fully and equally involved...as possible".
	That should not be taken to mean 50:50—that would not be a reflection of reality, as I was at pains to point out to the hon. Member for Stockport.
	The principle of new clause 4 lies behind early-day motion 128, which was launched more than a year ago and has now been signed by 345 hon. Members of all parties—a clear majority of hon. Members. It has been signed by 116 Labour Members, 157 Conservative Members and 50 Liberal Democrat Members—although, sadly, not the hon. Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole (Annette Brooke), who speaks from the Front Bench. Many Democratic Unionist party Members, all Ulster Unionist party Members and a goodly number of Welsh nationalists, Scottish nationalists, Social Democratic and Labour party Members and even Respect have also added their names to that early-day motion.
	At the eleventh hour in the passage of the Bill, if the Government are really serious about improving the life chances of some the most vulnerable children in our society, as the Minister for Children and Families put it on Second Reading, it is time—long overdue—that she took note of the views of the House as expressed in that early-day motion. I hope that, if we press the new clause to a vote, we will see a rather fuller Chamber, reflecting the commitment that hon. Members made when they signed that early-day motion and when they responded to their constituents through various organisations which lobbied them to say, "Yes, we support this principle." We now expect them to put their money where their mouths are, because the problem is getting worse, not better.
	Every year, between 150,000 and 250,000 parental couples separate. One in four of the 12 million children in this country will experience the separation of their parents at some point, and 68 per cent. of them will be aged 10 or less. As a child, I was in that position, as I am sure were many other hon. Members. For many children, the future in the family is sorted out amicably and does not require the interference of court proceedings, mercifully. We are told that 90 per cent. of cases are settled without recourse to the courts, but that figure disguises the fact that many non-resident parents are forced to submit to unsatisfactory, unfair or non-existent contact arrangements, because of the fear of long-drawn-out and expensive court procedures. That is why around 40 per cent. of non-resident parents lose contact—or lose meaningful contact—with their children within two years of a family breakdown. Of those who go down the legal route, because they feel that they have to, that number has mushroomed. The number of applications for contact going through the courts has ballooned from 17,470 in 1992 to 70,169. A study by Oxford university that was cited in Committee postulated that there may be2 million non-resident fathers in the population, as80 per cent. of children in separated families live exclusively or mainly with their mothers.
	Clearly, the current law is not working as a deterrent to acrimonious court action. We believe that it needs to be turned on its head—hence new clause 4, which does precisely that, backed up to varying degrees by other new clauses and amendments. What could be more sensible than new clause 4, which simply seeks to enshrine in statute what we are constantly told the courts seek to achieve in practice—that
	"a child's welfare is best served"
	through both parents being
	"as fully and equally involved in his parenting as possible"?
	From that basic premise, each parent can set out his or her stall on a level playing field and decide how time and attention can best be spent with his or her child. No arguments about rights will happen if we start from an equal basis.
	We have some very good parents in this country, but we also have some lousy ones. We have some dedicated, loving, attentive parents not living with their children who are too often frozen out of reasonable contact arrangements with their children; and we have some lousy parents who are living with and responsible for their children who too often use them as pawns in an acrimonious dispute with a former partner, particularly when they hold the strongest cards. Too many of those parents subsequently become serial breachers of contact orders with impunity, which is why the Bill was necessary in the first place.
	Family breakdown is rarely, if ever, the fault of the child, but too often the child becomes the victim when arrangements are not settled sensibly and amicably. The principle set out in new clause 4 was endorsed by the noble Lord Adonis, the Minister in the other place, when the Bill was debated there on 29 June 2005. He said:
	"We fully support the position established in case law that children normally benefit from a meaningful relationship with both parents following separation, so long as it is safe"—[ Official Report, House of Lords, 29 June 2005; Vol. 673, c. 251.]
	Let us therefore have that built into the Bill. The principle was also supported in the Green Paper, which said that after separation, both parents should have a responsibility for and a safe meaningful relationship with their children, so long as it was safe, and it pointed out that that was the view of most people in our society. I entirely concur with that.
	We all know the statistics about the benefits of maximising contact with non-resident parents, who tend to be the fathers. The children achieve more academically; they are less likely to get into trouble with the police; they become more sociable; and they have better health outcomes. Effectively, the new clauses and amendments are a statement of the bleeding obvious— [Interruption.] They need to be stated directly in the Bill because, as it stands, it will not work properly.
	I have dealt with new clause 4, which sets out the principle. New clause 9 is— [Interruption.] I believe that I used parliamentary language and I have not been hauled up for it, but I think that we have got the point from what I said.
	New clause 9 is a technical amendment to section 1 of the Children Act 1989, which is designed to extend the basic principle that in the absence of evidence of any likely harm being caused to the child, contact is better than no contact. New clause 11 is designed to extend the reasonable contact principle to family assistant orders. New clause 12 amends the welfare checklist in the Children Act 1989 and deals with the accusation that our amendments would undermine the paramountcy of the welfare of the child. I would contend in any case that we can have a hierarchy of presumptions about what is best for the welfare of the child. We have argued all along that maximising contact with parents is integral to promoting the welfare of the child. The welfare checklist in section 1, which is so important to the 1989 Act, already contains considerations about physical and emotional needs, the effect of changing circumstances and the capability of the parent, so surely desirability of contact complements that list, rather than undermines it. That is why new clause 12 is such an important addition to the amendments that we propose.
	New clause 13 mentions again the desirability of reasonable contact under section 1 of the Children Act. "Reasonable contact" is a phrase that we used frequently in Committee. In many cases, unfortunately, the corresponding amendments were not selected for debate, but reasonable contact goes to the heart of what we are suggesting. That is why new clause 24 aims to define what constitutes reasonable contact.
	New clause 24 states:
	"In determining what 'reasonable contact' is in respect of subsection (1A) the court shall have regard to the desirability of"—
	and we give five considerations of what constitutes reasonable contact. They are, first,
	"contact facilitating a positive and fulfilling relationship between the parent and the child".
	All of us can take a view on what that means. It clearly sends a message that reasonable contact needs to achieve something and is based on quality, not just quantity.
	Secondly, the court should have regard to the desirability of "frequent contact".
	A nice long letter once a year, a Christmas card, a birthday card or an annual visit is not frequent contact. That would not constitute reasonable contact. The third consideration is that contact should last for lengthy periods. A couple of hours snatched on a wet and windy seafront on an autumn trip does not constitute reasonable contact, unless it is ongoing.
	The fourth consideration is contact with siblings. This is an aspect on which many hon. Members focused in Committee, especially my hon. Friend the Member for Peterborough (Mr. Jackson). Siblings and extended family, which is the subject of the fifth consideration—brothers and sisters or, more frequently, grandparents of children in a family that has split up—become the victims and are frozen out of future relationships with those children. That is not in the best interests of the child's welfare and is also not fair to the grandparents and the siblings, who in many cases have played no part in whatever led to the breakdown of that family unit. New clause 24 is a useful addition to define what we mean by reasonable contact, which is essential to the success of the Bill.
	New clause 16, following on from the theme that I have just outlined, would amend section 5 of the Children Act to reinforce the desirability of contact with the extended family, particularly grandparents. Just because a couple decide that they no longer want to live with each other or continue a marriage, the children should not be deprived of meaningful contact and a meaningful ongoing quality relationship with grandparents, uncles, aunts and cousins, who can provide some degree of stability and continuity in what can be a very turbulent period, especially for young children. Their role is perhaps even more important at a time when a family unit breaks up than it was when a loving father and mother were present all the time for those children.

Tim Loughton: I am grateful for my hon. Friend's support. That point found support on both sides of the Committee. After my parents split up, my relationship with my grandparents was important—I particularly enjoyed my frequent visits to Eastbourne pier, where I became a fruit machine junky, although that is another story for another day.
	I will not go into detail on the new clauses tabled by other hon. Members. New clause 17, which has been tabled by the hon. Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole, is similar in many respects to our own attempt to amend the welfare checklist, and as such it merits our support.
	New clause 18, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Stafford (Mr. Kidney), concerns the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service objectives on welfare. It has some merit, and I will be interested to hear what he has to say. Newclause 19 deals with access by grandparents, which I have already mentioned and which we support.
	I have severe reservations about new clause 25 and new schedule 1, which have been tabled by the hon. Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole on behalf of the Liberal Democrats. The new clause and, in particular, the new schedule, which details the arrangements, go completely against the concept of non-prescription that we have tried to promote throughout the Bill. To try to set down in statute, whether it be by default or otherwise, prescriptive arrangements on how a child's time should be broken up risks treating that child as a commodity and undermines a lot of the good work on bringing about cordial arrangements between parents that are in the best interests of the child. For example, what would happen if a child who is supposed to spend every other Saturday afternoon with their father has a school football match? Must the child opt out of the football match in order to satisfy their father's or mother's part of the deal?
	I am sure that new clause 25 was tabled with the best of intentions, as is the case with so much of what we get from the Liberal Democrats, but it is entirely unworkable in practice and would be dangerous if it were added to the Bill. If the hon. Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole is minded to push new clause 25 to a vote, she should not come to us touting for support, because she will not get it.
	None of our amendments is rocket science. The concept of shared parenting being enshrined in statute is being looked at in a number of other countries and several US states: it was an undertaking of the new Canadian Government; it is being examined in the Senate in the Italy; a considerable amount of work is currently going on in Australia; and, as we speak, the Senate in Brazil is considering a new law establishing joint custody for children as the first option after divorce—the new law has already been passed by the federal deputy chamber.
	The idea is not new in this country. As I said in Committee, the previous Conservative Government considered amending the law along those lines in the Family Law Act 1996, section 11(4) of which states:
	"the general principle that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the welfare of the child will be best served by-
	(i) his having regular contact with those who have parental responsibility for him and with other members of his family; and
	(ii) the maintenance of as good a continuing relationship with his parents as is possible".
	I would also mention the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, which enshrines the desirability of maintaining personal relations and direct contact with non-resident parents on a regular basis.
	Why cannot we have that here? Many people with children's best interests at heart have been calling for it for many years. We have consistently called for these amendments throughout every stage of the Bill's progress in this House and in their lordships' Chamber. They would set out for a separating mother and father what the norm will be, what will be expected of them, and what will happen to them if they do not respect the judgments made. It is as simple as the principle that one is innocent until proven guilty. Someone who is a good parent should be deemed to be such unless and until it is proven reasonably that they are not. We want to establish the principle that it is a norm that reasonable contact should be assumed after a split because that is in the best interests of the child in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
	If the Government are serious about wanting to deal with the problems that many of our constituents face, and about producing a worthwhile piece of legislation that will do something about them instead of just talking about it, headlining the problem and ticking the boxes, they should add these new clauses to the Bill. They are fundamental to its workability and go to the heart of the problem. On that basis, I wholeheartedly commend them to the House.

David Kidney: New clause 18 stands in my name and in those of the hon. Members for Mid-Dorset and North Poole (Annette Brooke) and for Ceredigion (Mark Williams). New clause 19 also stands in my name.
	Debate on the Bill, in this House and outside, has largely been polarised around two issues and two groups of people. One group is keen to prevent an obstructive parent from stopping the other parent having contact with the child, while the other is worried about domestic violence and abuse being insufficiently recognised in court proceedings to make a parent allow contact between the child in their care and the parent who is not resident with the child. In new clause 18, I attempt to rise above those polarised points of view and say that there is merit in both arguments, but not in one to the exclusion of the other. I hit upon the idea that if the Bill were to have statutory objectives added to it, we might be able to reach an agreed solution. Sadly, it seems that I have fallen between the two stools, and neither have I attracted the support of the Minister. However, I will explain why I think that it is a good approach.
	Statutory objectives are quite rare, but they have been seen to work in other areas of the law. A good example from a completely different area is that of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which has four statutory objectives in regulating the Financial Services Authority. That authority has been able to adopt a risk-based approach to regulation that has been beneficial for this country's financial services sector, which is probably the most successful in the world. I decided that in trying to resolve disputes about contact with children, the courts, CAFCASS officers and those in the Welsh service who deal with preparing court cases involving parents who are in dispute, and the legal representatives of those who want to go to court, should all have regard to four statutory objectives, namely:
	"(a) the welfare of the child;
	(b) reduction of the risk of harm;
	(c) reasonable contact; and
	(d) post separation parenting."
	As the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) said, the first—the welfare of the child—comes from the Children Act 1989. That is a successful measure, which has stood the test of time. Its aims of putting children's interests first have been successful. Section 1 states that
	"the child's welfare shall be the court's paramount consideration."
	Nothing should interfere with that resounding statement that children's interests come first.
	The polarised arguments about preventing obstructive parents from getting in the way of contact in, for example, new clause 4, try to solve the problem by attacking the paramountcy of the child's welfare. New clause 4 would force the court to presume that the child's welfare includes so-called co-parenting. That is far too narrow. Section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989 contains a welfare checklist, which sets out all the issues that courts should take into account when deciding what is in the child's best interests. They include all the relevant matters that the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham set out for our consideration.

David Kidney: With the greatest respect to the hon. Gentleman, for whom I have great respect, especially for his views about grandparents in the sort of proceedings that we are discussing, I believe that he is wrong. As I said, the Children Act 1989 has stood the test of time and thousands of courts have made decisions about contact in the light of that measure. The welfare of the child and its paramountcy is well understood and applied correctly by the courts.
	The presumption of contact is well established. Those of us who served on the Committee often heard reference to a report by Her Majesty's inspectorate of court administration, called "Domestic Violence, Safety and Family Proceedings", which said that in all the practice sessions that it had observed in the inspection, the presumption of contact was evident. Indeed, paragraph 3.9 of the report worryingly stated:
	"and there was consistent evidence that inappropriate assumptions about contact were made, rather than assessments about whether there was any risk associated with domestic abuse cases."
	The presumption of contact is therefore alive and well and the report alerts us to the fact that it applies to an inappropriate extent and that, in some cases, there might be danger for children and parents in allowing contact to proceed.
	That brings us to the statutory objective that I propose—to reduce the risk of harm. The other great polarised debate is about whether there should be no contact if there is any risk at all of abuse to the child or the other parent. Again, I believe that it goes too far, but until the House of Lords included clause 7, the Bill contained no provision for the court even to ascertain whether any harm was being done.
	The statement that preceded our proceedings was about schools checking whether staff employed there might pose a risk to children. What about courts? They order somebody to allow contact. Surely they should consider whether there is a risk of harm. Clause 7 provides that if there is suspicion of harm, CAFCASS will undertake a risk assessment, but the Bill includes nothing about what anyone does with it. Under clause 7, at least it will go to the court, and the court will have the power to make orders. My statutory objective about reducing the risk of harm would at least remind the courts that, when they receive a risk assessment report, something ought to be done with it.
	5.30 pm
	The fourth of my statutory objectives deals with parenting relationships after a separation. This brings me to a report to which the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham and I both referred with approval in Committee. It is an excellent report by the university of Oxford, "Family Policy Briefing 3", produced in January 2004, which gives advice to policy makers such as ourselves. Its final section, "The way forward", warns us to be cautious about making any legislative change at all. It states:
	"Introducing a presumption of contact is...problematic"
	although the
	"case for amending the Children Act may be stronger in relation to domestic violence".
	The report goes on:
	"Post-separation parenting is a very neglected area...There would be widespread support for a programme aimed at improving service provision"
	to promote better relationships between parents after they separate. That is why my fourth statutory objective would be beneficial in the longer term. This is a longer-term issue.

David Kidney: I mentioned earlier the problems associated with polarised debates. There are lots of reasons why contact does not proceed, including obstructive parents, delays in the investigations associated with court proceedings, and a lack of resources for those who are supposed to give the kind of support about which the hon. Gentleman is asking.
	I note that CAFCASS is developing a change to its approach to court proceedings, so that it can make more active interventions at the beginning of a case. In that way, it could facilitate early agreements and make use of the provisions in the Bill for contact activities. It would therefore be easier to solve problems at the beginning. "Sort, not report" is the strap-line that it uses. Instead of writing a report that could take12 weeks to deliver, it will try to act more quickly to solve the problem. So perhaps a change of approach from CAFCASS, with good leadership and reasonable resources, is the way to ensure that there is support during court proceedings, when judges look for support for the directions that they give.
	I want to move on to new clause 19 in a moment, but for completeness I want to mention a charity in my constituency called Stafford PAIRS, which stands for "preventing abuse in relationships". The charity is strongly supportive of risk assessments in cases of domestic violence or abuse. One of the partners to that charity, a worker with Women's Aid in Stafford, told me that, of 18 clients with whom she had dealt since October 2004, three had expressed suicidal feelings because of the pressures of being compelled through court proceedings to allow the other parent contact with their child after domestic violence had caused the breakdown of the relationship. I want people to appreciate the other side of the argument.
	New clause 19 is a procedural amendment that would allow grandparents the same opportunity to ask a court to allow contact that a parent has now. Parents are entitled, as of right, to apply to a court for a contact order, but grandparents are not. The new clause proposes that grandparents should have the same right to join in proceedings to ask the court to consider whether a contact order should be granted in their favour. I leave it to the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham to explain why relationships with grandparents are beneficial to grandchildren. I merely say that grandparents should be given the opportunity to show that to the courts, and that court orders would then follow.
	New clause 19 also proposes that other family carers—not parents or grandparents—who have cared for a child for at least a year ought to be at least in the same position as a foster carer who has cared for a child for a year, and should be able to apply to the court for a contact order. The new clause is a procedural device to put such people on the same level as those who already have similar rights under legislation.
	As I seem to have little support from Members on either side of the House or from the Government Front Bench, I am not hopeful that my new clauses will make progress, but I believe that if the Bill is to prove a lasting success when enacted, we must do more both to ensure that children maintain contact with both parents, and to root out cases of domestic violence earlier.

Annette Brooke: I want to move on—

Hon. Members: Give way.

Annette Brooke: Very well, I give way to the hon. Gentleman.

Annette Brooke: Perhaps I should just pass on that intervention. We will support the Select Committee recommendation—which has been accepted by a number of people who gave evidence to the Committee and were involved in the discussions—that a statement should be inserted into the welfare checklist required under the Children Act 1989. For my version of the provision, I have chosen the wording recommended by the Select Committee—that the courts should have regard to
	"the importance of sustaining a relationship between the child and a non-residential parent".
	It is important that we find wording that will not cause conflict between two legal presumptions. To pursue something that might lead to a dangerous outcome is far more damaging than feeling that one has signed one's life away because one has signed an early-day motion. When people sign an early-day motion they do not expect every word of it to appear in legislation.
	Our proposal is important to us; there should be such a legislative statement. I was attracted to the new clause proposed by the hon. Member for Stafford(Mr. Kidney), as its ingredients included all the issues that we want to raise. We need provisions that will move us forward rather than saying, "No, no, we cannot put anything on the face of the Bill", but we must give them due consideration.
	It is interesting that the Government picked up the suggestion for an addition to the welfare checklist as an idea that they would investigate. It was supported by the scrutiny Committee for the draft Bill, but the Government said at one stage that it was not appropriate because it would be relevant only to private law and not to public law. I cannot follow that argument, because one would not need to take such a checklist into consideration in a public law case. I would have thought that there was a way round that point and that it need not be the problem that has been suggested.
	All Liberal Democrat MPs are concerned that children and parents retain contact where it is safe to do so, but we need to find the right route. I look forward to the response of the Under-Secretary of State for Education and Skills, the hon. Member for Gloucester (Mr. Dhanda). New clause 4 is slightly different from the provision on which we voted in Committee, but if he can reassure me that it is perfectly safe, we could vote for it. However, on such an important issue, when we know that children die if wrong decisions are made—

Stewart Jackson: I wish to speak to new clause 4, which I tabled with my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton), before touching on new clauses 13, 16 and 19. I will resist the temptation to say that it is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole (Annette Brooke), and merely observe that the Liberal Democrats are Olympic medal winners in sanctimonious and patronising equivocation. At the election, the Conservatives will expose their cynicism and duplicity in every constituency. We are not playing politics, as we want to make local undertakings and do something completely different when the votes come in.
	New clause 4 deals with the presumption in favour of co-parenting and reasonable contact. We all believe that the child's welfare is best served by residency with their parents or, if they do not live together, residency with one parent. Reasonable contact allows both parents to be fully involved in parenting. Having participated in the lengthy proceedings on the Bill, I believe that there has been too much heat but not enough light. I broadly support the Bill with some important caveats, but it is a missed opportunity. It could have united children's charities and Families Need Fathers; it could have united parties from all parts of the House. However, after the trench warfare of the past year or so in the other place, in Standing Committee, and on Second Reading, consensus has been lost. The Government have set their face against concessions, and are guilty of intransigence, inertia and discrimination, particularly against non-resident parents of both sexes.
	New clause 4 does not undermine the paramountcy principle—indeed, it enhances it. My hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) has a strong record in extolling the virtues of co-parenting and the importance to the future of children in this country of having—if at all possible, and with the caveat that the safety of the child is always paramount—both parents involved in their upbringing.
	The Government are using the paramountcy principle as a rock on which all appeals to flexibility and logic, and the experience of real life, are smashed. The paramountcy principle is an opaque panacea; it is not set down in legislation and it is used by Ministers and Back Benchers to stop any discussion, even of the hierarchy of paramountcy.
	This issue is about human rights, fairness and equity, and equality of gender. I will not take any lectures from the Liberal Democrats because, like many Members in all parts of the Chamber, I know from my surgery casework how this issue affects and undermines families. It is important that we bear it in mind that we are talking not about dry, dusty, arcane legal principles, but people's lives and futures, and their children.
	Frankly, I cannot understand why parents who were fit and proper parents when they were married, or together in a non-married relationship, are deemed suddenly to cross a line and to become unfit parents, and are therefore not permitted to see their children—under the auspices of family courts or otherwise. No Minister has explained that to any of us. Why are they any less good, loving, caring parents? Ministers need to address that issue.
	Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, one of the pre-eminent experts in family law in this country and president of the family division, recently said:
	"There is, of course, no doubt that some parents, particularly mothers, are responsible for alienating their children from their fathers without good reason and thereby creating this sometimes insoluble problem. That unhappy state of affairs, well known in family courts, is a long way from recognised syndrome requiring mental health professionals to play an expert role."
	Baroness Ashton stated in a letter of 14 July 2006 to Baroness Morris of Bolton:
	"We accept that in many cases this"—
	the presumption of co-parenting—
	"is true and indeed this position is supported by case law, which states that children generally benefit from a meaningful relationship with both parents after separation so long as it is safe and in their best interest."
	In further case law, the judge ruling in the 1997 caseR  v. B said that
	"to deprive a father who bona fide wishes to have contact with his child of that contact is a drastic step. The court's general policy is clear: contact between a child and its natural parent is something which should be maintained wherever this is practical".
	So Ministers are clearly setting their faces against case law, which raises the important and apposite question of why they are doing so. But is it case law in respect of reasonable contact? It is probably not, because reasonable contact is not enshrined in current legislation; only contact is. That is of relevance to an important point that my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham made earlier. A postcard every month or every year, or a telephone call, is not reasonable contact. The Minister should address that issue in his concluding remarks.
	It might be appropriate at this stage to refer to the comments made in the briefings of children's charities such as the National Children's Home and Barnardo's, and in particular the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. As I said on Second Reading and in Committee, I deprecate their comments because they are based on an unfair analysis, they are complacent and partial, and they support the discrimination inherent in the Government's position.
	Let us make no mistake: the Government's approach to the family law system is failing non-resident parents—men and women—as well as extended family members. I quote Sir Bob Geldof, who, as Members know, has written on this subject. In "The Real Love That Dare Not Speak Its Name: A Sometimes Coherent Rant", he wrote:
	"Upon separation, the system is slow and delay occurs immediately. This allows the status quo to be established. As the process labours on it becomes impossible to alter. This is unfair. It is nearly always possible for the resident parent (let's face it, the girl)"—
	not very politically correct, but they are his words—
	"to establish a pattern. It is then deemed in the child's interest not to break this routine. But at the cost of losing sight and touch of their father, we must really examine all our assumptions without fear. Then we can move to building a more equitable system benefiting all equally."
	The paramountcy principle is not stated anywhere and is used with impunity to defend the current situation. A key institutional issue is that certain vested interests would be challenged by changes to the current system. It is not only children's charities that have such vested interests; so, too, do the National Association of Probation Officers and some elements in the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service.
	New clause 4 would strengthen, rather than weaken, the paramountcy principle. Throughout the Bill's passage—in the different stages in the other place, in Committee and in the Chamber—I have yet to hear one convincing, coherent and persuasive argument against such a new clause, and certainly not from the hon. Member for Liverpool, Garston (Maria Eagle), whose presence on the Front Bench is much missed.
	The arguments advanced are based on myths. Child abuse is just as likely from a stressed sole parent or their partner as from a non-resident parent.  [ Interruption. ] The hon. Member for Luton, South (Margaret Moran) makes faces from a sedentary position, but that is the case. Recently, the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents concluded, in an analysis of children's injuries, that more malicious injuries were inflicted by mothers than by fathers. Indeed, an NSPCC report published in 2000, which that charity currently conveniently disregards, entitled "Child maltreatment in the United Kingdom: a study of the prevalence of child abuse and neglect", stated that
	"most violence occurred at home (78 per cent.) with mothers being primarily responsible in 49 per cent. of cases and fathers in 40 per cent. of cases".
	When this matter was debated at length in the other place, Lord Northbourne made some key points that bear repetition about the success of co-parenting and maximum conflict resolution—the subject of new clause 22—and the early intervention parenting plan, with which new clause 1, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham, deals. In Florida—for which we could equally substitute Canada, Australia and other states in the United States—the system, which uses the attributes proposed in our new clauses, is working. Families are staying together, children are safe and we are seeing reasonable shared parenting and reasonable contact—without casting aside the paramountcy principle and the safety and welfare of children. The provision is about gender equality and the rights of children to enjoy the love of both parents, as long as it is safe for them to do so. I look to the Minister to rise to the challenge and talk about the paramountcy principle and the paucity of the arguments that were used by the Government at all the stages of the Bill.

Stewart Jackson: The hon. Lady knows that I am talking sense, despite her heckles.
	New clause 10, on reasonable contact, seeks to amend the Children Act 1989. At the moment, as I said, we have contact set down in legislation, but not reasonable contact. If hon. Members do not like the word "reasonable", they may prefer "meaningful". The words are interchangeable. The new clause requests the court to have regard to the issue of reasonableness, but it is important to make the point that inserting the concept of reasonableness does not fetter the discretion of the court. Despite the debate in the other place and in this House, we are not talking about something that is necessarily wedded to a time-bound formula. We are talking not about equal being 50:50, but about equal being fair. We have some lawyers here today. The concept of reasonableness is easily understood by lawyers and it would be practically understood in the family courts. I cannot understand why the Government should disregard our new clause.
	In 2004, Lord Justice Wall, as quoted byLord Adonis in the other place, said:
	"Unless there are cogent reasons against it the children of separated parents are entitled to know and have the love and society of both their parents...the courts recognise the vital importance of the role of non-resident fathers in the lives of their children"—[ Official Report, House of Lords, 11 October 2005; Vol. 674, c. GC6-7.]
	The Government pay due regard to case law, the position of Ministers and the settled opinion of a wide variety of groups that are stakeholders in the debate, but they cannot go that final step in accepting the reasonable amendment of inserting the word "reasonable" in the Bill.
	We have to ask ourselves whether the Children Act really meant contact to be a postcard, a snatched telephone call or a trip to McDonald's for 30 minutes? When we enacted that landmark legislation under a Conservative Government in 1989, did we really mean to enshrine in legislation that level of contact? The answer is, no, we did not. Surely it is right that the family courts should be predisposed towards reasonableness and that the burden of proof should lie in favour of more reasonable contact.
	There is one thing on which I will agree with the hon. Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole (Annette Brooke). [ Interruption. ] Steady on. There is a human rights issue in respect of our obligations to the United Nations. At present, the United Kingdom is de facto in breach of the UN convention on the rights of the child, because it can be argued that it prevents reasonable access to children's parents.
	I will talk briefly—I hope—on grandparents' rights, which is the subject of new clause 19. I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Stafford (Mr. Kidney) for his reasonable, cogent and well argued new clause. I am sorry that, in some respects, it looks as though the Government are going to ignore that and ignore the huge welter of evidence from our postbags and surgeries that an injustice needs to be righted with respect to grandparents.

Nadine Dorries: Two of my constituents who are grandparents, Mr. andMrs. Jennings, have found themselves responsible through no fault of their own for the care of two very young children at a time in their life when they are on reduced incomes and when they are least able to look after them. They have absolutely no assistance whatsoever. They wrote to Ministers some considerable time ago, but they contacted me today to say that they still have not had a reply. Does my hon. Friend agree that perhaps we should be looking at providing more assistance for grandparents, not less?

Stewart Jackson: My hon. Friend makes an important point. I am sure that the Minister is listening closely with respect to the correspondence entered into by her constituents.
	In Committee, we did not have as long as we would have liked to debate the issue of grandparents' rights and the diminution of those rights in respect of the family court, so you will forgive me if I put the importance of new clause 19 into context, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Again, this is a debate about the value society places on people who do a fantastic job in caring for their family, whose love is unconditional and who feel excluded from the decision-making processes in family courts in particular. Let us make no mistake: grandparents are role models and good carers. They are a bridge between the past and the future. The case for reform in relation to the issue raised by the hon. Member for Stafford is compelling. How can it be right that many grandparents, often on low incomes, in or near retirement, become the sole carers for their grandchildren, but, in taking on that vital role as foster parents, do not have the same rights as unrelated foster parents in terms of their income, benefits and allowances? That issue was brought to our attention by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mrs. Dorries).
	The issue is not party political in that respect. I repeat that the right hon. Member for Birkenhead(Mr. Field) has done an excellent job in keeping the issue at the top of the agenda with his studies and the reports that he has produced about grandparents in his constituency on the Wirral and the difficulties that they have making ends meet as foster parents. I commend to the House a report produced by the families and social capital group at London South Bank university last summer, called "An Evaluation of the Grandparent-Toddler Groups Initiative", which shows the positive impact that grandparents have on very young children and the work that they do in saving the state significant amounts of public money.
	Again, the obsession with the paramountcy principle is being used to block reasonable access by grandparents. I do not believe that that is right. I cannot believe that the Government have not made a more compelling argument against getting rid of the requirement to seek leave of a court to apply for a contact order. I read the reports of the Standing Committee and the Second Reading debate and I could not find a coherent argument against that from the hon. Member for Liverpool, Garston. The Government seem to have decided that no amount of argument—even by people as eloquent as the hon. Member for Stafford—will prevent them from carrying on as they are now, which means continuing to be unfair to grandparents vis-à-vis non-family carers. When I say grandparents, I mean extended family carers as well. The irony is that primary legislation is not needed. The measure could have been enacted by secondary legislation two or three years ago. There is a consensus across the House. I would like the Minister to look at that point and to make the case for why the measure has not been enacted.
	We face some key challenges on the question of grandparents, although I think that the argument is coming our way. People realise that it is wrong to discriminate financially. It is wrong that the 1989 Act has not been implemented properly in respect of the financial circumstances of grandparents and the presumption that grandparents and the extended family should be considered as carers before others. I am thus delighted to support new clause 19, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Stafford. I am proud to be associated with the campaign of the Grandparents Association and others. They have done an excellent job.
	Let us work on a cross-party basis. I will be delighted if the Minister says that the power of my rhetoric and my eloquence and soaring oratory has convinced him of the right thing to do. We would need not a new Bill, but good sense and the political will to right a profound wrong. I hope that he will make my day and that of the hon. Member for Stafford by agreeing to do that— [ Interruption. ] I notice that the Minister for the Cabinet Office, the former Chief Whip, has not moved on to new pastures and is still heckling from the Front Bench. However, I conclude by repeating my support for the new clauses that I have mentioned.

Parmjit Dhanda: I fear that the consensus that we have achieved so far today might be about to come to an end. The hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) put some statistics on record, so I thought that I would kick off by doing the same. He might not entirely agree with the figures, but they come from the Office for National Statistics. About three quarters of non-resident parents have some direct contact. Around three quarters of non-resident parents have either direct or indirect contact at least once a week, and less than 10 per cent. of non-resident parents have no contact with their children at all. It is also worth saying that less than 1 per cent. of applications for contact are refused by the courts. Those statistics give some of the context for the debate that the hon. Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole (Annette Brooke) wanted to put on record.
	The new clauses and new schedule in the large and varied group are united by a desire to promote contact between children and both their parents, or other relatives, following parental separation. Some of the measures raise specific points to which I will turn in due course, but there are fundamental points of principle that run through all of them.
	First, I make it absolutely clear that it is our view that children will nearly always benefit from a continued and meaningful relationship with both parents following separation, so long as that is safe and in their best interest. I believe that we can all agree on that, and the debates in Committee made it clear that hon. Members on both sides of the House are united behind that position. Our view is that the legislative framework that we have in place, which is centred on the excellent Children Act 1989, is the right one. The paramountcy principle is clearly laid out in that Act, which says clearly and without qualification that when deciding any question affecting a child's upbringing, the welfare of the child should be the court's paramount consideration. I do not think that there is any disagreement about that either.
	The worry that hon. Members on both sides of the House have expressed is about what is happening in practice. We all regularly hear sad stories from our constituents in our surgeries. Such cases are the motivation behind many of the measures in this group of new clauses. The vast majority of the measures would insert provisions into the Children Act 1989 to direct the courts to promote, or presume that there should be, contact with both parents, but that causes us much concern. We have examined the matter closely, but, quite simply, we cannot find a form of words that would send such a signal to the courts without moving the focus of legislation away from the fundamental principle that the welfare of the child is paramount. Any shift in favour of a presumption would be a move towards a legal model under which a court would have to start by assuming the specific position that as much contact as possible is in a child's best interest. It would have to take that position independently of considering the facts of a particular case and move away from it only in exceptional circumstances. Such an approach would very different from starting by considering an individual child and ordering what is best for that child, which is the legal position that we have at present. I believe that that position is right.
	However, that is not to say that everything is perfect—that is something on which I agree with the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham. We share the concern that there might be a need for a change in practice and a shift towards better support for families to help to ensure that both parents remain involved in parenting. Such an approach would require a shift that was more cultural than legislative.
	I hope that I have explained not only our general concerns about the measures, but our sympathy for the intentions behind them. Some of the measures raise specific difficulties that I shall now address.
	The aim of several of the measures is to try to avert cases from going to the courts by giving parents an idea in advance of what a court would be likely to order. The problem of trying to do that is illustrated graphically by new schedule 1, which new clause 25 would insert in the Bill, in which the hon. Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole has made a valiant attempt to set out what default contact arrangements might look like. As hon. Members will have noted, new schedule 1 is extremely detailed. I am sure that the hon. Lady accepts that it is easy to imagine the objections that would come in from parents about reasons why the arrangements would not be appropriate in their individual case. Even more concerning is the fact that the new schedule would apply to people who had never been anywhere near a court, so it would represent a rather inappropriate intrusion by the state into the lives of private individuals who have not turned to the courts at all.
	Although new clause 9 is essentially about a presumption of contact, it would have the very odd effect of changing the no order principle in the Children Act 1989. That principle, as it stands, says that a court should not make an order unless it is satisfied that doing so is better for the child than making no order at all. That is self-evidently a sensible position, but new clause 9 would drive a coach and horses through it by saying, in effect, that a court should make an order for "reasonable contact", even in the absence of any evidence that doing so would be better for the child than making no order.
	New clause 11 would require the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service and local authority officers to proceed on a presumption of reasonable contact when carrying out family assistance orders. Such a requirement would be odd in the context of orders that are intended to support children and families. The role of an officer carrying out such an order is to "advise, assist, and befriend", usually in the context of directions given by a court, not to make assumptions about what may or may not be in those people's best interests.
	New clauses 12 and 17 would insert presumptions of contact into the welfare checklist. I am impressed by the innovation of the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham because he seems to have come at the Bill from every angle to try to find a way of getting his point across. Such measures would be an especially inappropriate way of proceeding. As was explained in Committee, the welfare checklist is a list of things to which courts must have regard when making their decisions. It includes matters such as any harm that the child may have suffered, the ascertainable wishes and feelings of a child and the capacity of a child's parents to look after the child. All those factors are relevant, but do not direct the court one way or another about what it should decide. There is thus a clear and stark difference between the approaches. A presumption of contact would be a very strange addition to the checklist in this context. A further problem would be that the welfare checklist applies in public law cases, such as care proceedings, although I do not believe that the hon. Gentleman would wish such cases to be covered by new clause 12.
	New clauses 13, 4, and 24 express in different ways a simple presumption of contact. I have said already that we are concerned that all the new clauses would move away from the paramountcy principle as the centre of children's law, which we would consider to be deeply undesirable.
	New clause 24 makes some attempts to explain what "reasonable contact" means, including the worthy sentence that it should facilitate
	"a positive and fulfilling relationship"
	We can all agree with that as a goal, but I do not believe that a statutory presumption is the best way forward.
	New clause 16 extends the principle of a presumption to the extended family. I know that it reflects the concerns of grandparents in particular, something to which I shall return in a moment. Grandparents are sometimes tragically excluded from their children's lives as a result of a conflict between parents. That is unjust and it can have a terrible side effect, given the pain that individuals feel at the end of a relationship. It is, however, not something that can be solved by a presumption that would serve only to weaken the paramountcy principle.
	New clause 18 comes at the problem from yet another perspective. I have discussed the clause—we had a discussion outside the Chamber—with my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford (Mr. Kidney), who was a little downhearted earlier on because he did not see me giving in on this issue. I know that my hon. Friend's aim is to find a way through the difficulties that I have set out, namely avoiding conflict with the paramountcy principle. He does so by setting out, instead of a presumption, a set of objectives that the court should have in mind when making provision about contact with the child. These are worthy objectives, including reducing the risk of harm to the child and promoting contact between the child and the child's parents and other family members.
	Unfortunately, as I said to my hon. Friend when we met, the new clause does not avoid the danger of upsetting the paramountcy principle. It would effectively alter the starting point of the court, away from whatever is best for an individual child and towards making orders that would fit with the objectives set out in new clause 18.
	Finally, there is new clause 19.

Parmjit Dhanda: I think that I have made the point on new clause 17 already. I will be happy to provide further information to the hon. Lady in writing. It does not sound as if I have satisfied her with the conclusions that I have come to on that new clause.
	On grandparents, the courts will consider whether to grant leave at the same time as the first hearing in contact proceedings. Thus, applicants are not required to pay two sets of fees and the requirement does not create delay. We have considered the issue withgreat care. On balance, I think that the requirement for leave and a three-year period is an important safeguard. However, having listened to the hon. Member for Peterborough (Mr. Jackson), and having had good discussions with my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford, I can undertake to review cases of grandparents who have to seek leave of the court. I am happy to do that and to engage in some further work in that area.

Parmjit Dhanda: That is a fair point. All hon. Members receive correspondence about that. We want to test whether that is the case and whether there is an evidence base for that. I undertake to hold a review on exactly that.
	This is a substantial group of new clauses and I hope that hon. Members will forgive me for having been brief in dealing with each of them. I have said that our fundamental concern is that all the new clauses, in on way or another, could risk moving courts away from the statutory focus on doing what is best for the child. Having listened to the debate, I hope that hon. Members will consider the points that I have made and not press the new clauses to a vote.

Tim Loughton: We have certainly had another full and lengthy debate, but I fear that, yet again, it is without impact on the Government. I congratulate the new Minister on his appointment. He has certainly been thrown in at the deep end, but I fear that, in taking on this difficult mantle, he has adopted the same mindset as the Minister for Children and Families—one of being completely closed to practical, sensible suggestions, based on the real-life experiences of our constituents throughout the country, in refusingyet again in any way to amend the Bill, which is why it will fail.
	I want to make a few brief comments because we have had a lengthy debate. The hon. Member for Stafford (Mr. Kidney) put some perfectly reasonable cases in speaking to his two new clauses. New clause 18, on statutory objectives, would be a sensible way forward, and he drew a very good analogy with the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, with which he and I were involved all those years ago. There is certainly a cut-across that could be applied in this case.
	The procedure for allowing grandparents greater access that the hon. Gentleman sets out in newclause 19 is absolutely essential, and I am encouraged by the Minister's last comments about agreeing to look into that issue. I hope that there will be a meaningful review of the problem. If the hon. Gentleman were minded to press either of his new clauses to a vote—I think that he probably will not, given his ambitions for his place on the Government Benches—he would find support among Opposition Members at the very least. I am sorry if he does not quite have the courage of those convictions to push those new clauses all the way.
	We should not be surprised about the extraordinary new clauses and lack of consistency from the Liberal Democrats. I feel some sympathy with the hon. Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole (Annette Brooke)—it is not easy being a Liberal Democrat Member of Parliament, signing up to one thing and doing another in the Lobby—but she said that new schedule 1 was easy to ridicule. Well, it is, which is why I want to have another go at it. Let us consider what would be required.
	The hon. Lady admits that new schedule 1 may not be exactly flawless, but it says that
	"any child who has attained the age of one year but is not yet in full-time education...shall...stay with the non-resident parent on alternative weekends from 10 a.m. on Saturday until 5 p.m. on Sunday".
	It also says:
	"In the case of any child in full-time education who has not yet attained the age of fourteen years, the child shall...stay with the non-resident parent on alternate weekends from after the child finishes school on Friday until 6 p.m. on Sunday".
	My son would be furious: he would miss "Time Team" on Sunday afternoons if that provision were to apply to a situation such as mine. He would then
	"visit the non-resident parent from 4 p.m. until 6 p.m. every Wednesday".
	Well, that is cricket practice out of the way as well. That is absurd. It is the sort of prescriptive nonsense that we must avoid in the Bill.

New Clause 17
	 — 
	NON-RESIDENT PARENTS

'After section 16 of the Children Act 1989 (c.41) insert—
	"16A Risk assessments
	(1) This section applies to the following functions of officers of the Service or Welsh family proceedings officers—
	(a) any function in connection with family proceedings in which the court has power to make an order under this Part with respect to a child or in which a question with respect to such an order arises;
	(b) any function in connection with an order made by the court in such proceedings.
	(2) If, in carrying out any function to which this section applies, an officer of the Service or a Welsh family proceedings officer is given reasonable grounds to suspect that the child concerned is at risk of significant harm, he must—
	(a) make a risk assessment in relation to the child, and
	(b) provide the risk assessment to the court.
	(3) In respect of subsection (2), significant risk involves a risk—
	(a) to the child's physical safety, or
	(b) of sexual abuse.
	(4) All risk assessments undertaken pursuant to subsection (2) shall proceed on the presumption that the child's interests are best served through reasonable contact with both parents unless good reason to the contrary is shown and the safety of a child is not an issue.
	(5) A risk assessment, in relation to a child who is at risk of suffering harm of a particular sort, is an assessment of the riskof that harm being suffered by the child.
	(6) In any risk assessment based upon the likelihood of recurrence of previous risks it shall be a requirement that no reliance is placed upon previous events or previous risks in the absence of a finding of fact that those events or risks actually occurred."'.— [Mrs. Miller.]
	 Brought up, and read the First time.

Maria Miller: I thank my hon. Friend for his timely intervention. That is precisely the sort of problem that we are trying to overcome, not only in this amendment but in others. That is not in any way to detract from the significant problems that are faced by families and by children throughout such proceedings. There are genuine problems associated with domestic violence and sexual abuse, but equally we have to ensure that parents do not use these provisions as a tool to beat each other over the head.
	A risk assessment must be undertaken only when there is a real risk of harm. The level of repeat applications as a result of breaches of court orders illustrates the concern about the motivations of some parents in this situation. They are obviously in a very small minority, but it is something of which we need to be aware. It is our No. 1 priority to ensure the welfare of the child is protected at all stages, and part of that is to ensure that they are not tied up in protracted court proceedings. My hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham and I recently went to a family court to see first-hand some of the pressures that children are put under in these situations, not by the courts but by the emotional nature of the proceedings. We must always get the balance right and ensure that we are, as the Minister is always stressing to us, acting in the best interests of the child, but we must not allow the tools in the Bill to be used in a way that I am sure that he and his colleagues would not wish them to be used. That is the point that we are trying to make.
	My hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham talked at some length about reasonable contact with both parents, so I will not delay the House with an equally detailed argument. I remind the House that it is not a requirement in law for a resident parent to allow contact with another parent, because it is viewed as a private matter, as is entirely proper. Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss has said:
	"The courts naturally start with the view that in most cases contact between the child and the non-resident parent is desirable both for the child and for the parent."
	It is desirable, but it is not enshrined in legislation. We are talking about those who come to the courts to get resolutions to the difficulties that they face in separation and divorce. Only 10 per cent. of people in this situation undertake separation and divorce; 90 per cent. of them do not go to court. We should be concerned about the fact so many people do not undertake any formal separation procedure. In my constituency, that gives rise to several cases whereby some years after a separation parents can find that if relations break down contact with children can be lost. Settlements that have been reached informally can become difficult to keep in place if they have not been formalised, perhaps not through the courts but in another way.
	I should like the Minister to acknowledge that contact is associated with better outcomes for children. To all of us who are parents, aunts, uncles or grandparents, that is not something that we should question. It is a matter of fact that children who have contact with both parents experience much better outcomes in their lives. It is not just down to the fact of contact but to the nature of the contact that those children enjoy with both their parents. That is why we are striving to gain an acknowledgement from the Government that reasonable contact is crucial. Other hon. Members are in receipt of an excellent briefing from the university of Oxford's department of social work and social policy which draws out the point that the mere presence of a father is not enough—it is the quality of the contact, the parenting, and the time that non-resident parents are allowed to spend with their children that are so vital. I urge the Minister to consider that further.
	I shall say a few words about the tighter definition of what constitutes a risk of harm to the child. It is important that we make risk assessments when there is a genuine risk of harm to the child. We cannot allow this provision to be used by parents who are not enjoying the best of relations—otherwise, they would not be seeking the guidance of the court—to formalise and legitimise the breaking of contact between a non-resident parent and a child. Our amendment would ensure that the Bill works in the way that we all want—in the best interests of the child.
	In reality, many non-resident parents lose contact with their children after divorce. I was disappointed when the Minister gave the House a very narrow version of the research that is available on this. He quoted from one source, but there are several differing sources. It is confusing, but we must understand that there is a problem for fathers, mothers and grandparents. The tone of the Minister's response underestimated its importance; frankly, he was complacent. He should go away and think about this further. The number of people involved in divorce and separation is growing. The situation could be dealt with in one way a decade ago but has to be dealt with very differently now. There are 160,000 divorces a year, which is the highest number for a decade. Three million children have experienced divorce or separation. In 2004, 700,000 contact orders were awarded; in 1992, the figure was 17,000. We need to ensure that the Bill covers not only the few intractable cases but the very many people who are going through this. We must set out guidelines on how people should conduct themselves through that difficult process.
	It is our duty to protect a growing group of children. As my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham said, 345 hon. Members have shown support for the concept of legal presumption of contact. The concept is supported throughout the House and I hope that the Government listen to the strength of feeling on that important matter.

Stewart Jackson: My hon. Friend makes a compelling case. Is part of the problem with the family courts the fact that the Government are not in a position to undertake a rational analysis of what is going on because they do not collect the data on many issues properly? For example, when I wrote to the Department for Constitutional Affairs about the number of people who apply for special guardianship orders, the answer was that the Department did not collect that data. How can the Government examine and take the policy forward if they do not collect the appropriate data about which to make a decision?

Maria Miller: My hon. Friend makes a pertinent point. I had hoped that the Under-Secretary, who is new to his job, would have appreciated the scale of difference in the available data and felt that it deserved further investigation. My hon. Friend is right to raise the matter. I reiterate that the number of people that the matter affects is growing. The Government cannot continue to bury their head in the sand. We need to get to the bottom of the issue.
	The problem affects not only men but women. Women have attended my surgery who have found it difficult as non-resident parents to keep in contact with their children. If the Government lend their support to the amendment, they would acknowledge that the matter needs addressing.

Annette Brooke: I want to make some brief comments about amendment No. 19. Liberal Democrat Members welcome the new risk assessment that clause 7 proposes, but we believe that there is room for clarification. At the moment, there is a lack of detail about what a risk assessment would involve.
	Clause 7 simply says that a risk assessment is an assessment of risk. I abbreviate slightly, but that is what it boils down to. Subsection (3) states:
	"A risk assessment, in relation to a child who is at risk of suffering harm of a particular sort, is an assessment of the risk of that harm being suffered by the child."
	That lacks clarity. Surely there is scope for saying a little more in the Bill or perhaps I could tempt the Under-Secretary to offer some guidance—I realise that that is a favoured medium for clarification.
	Amendment No. 19 would ensure that risk assessments included analysis of the impact on the child of the different options that the court could choose—for example, ascertaining how a child would fare if a court ordered one sort of contact order rather than another. That could provide a useful tool to improve the court's decision making in cases in which the child may be at risk, and make the court's decision that much more likely to be safe and in the child's interests. The amendment would make risk assessments more valuable in that they would contain information to guide the courts to make better contact arrangements. I would be interested in the Under-Secretary's response and whether he could at least say that clause 7 requires more guidance.

Peter Bone: I want clarification on circumstances in which the mother has the child, the father is absent, the mother suddenly says that there is violence and that the father cannot see the child when there is no evidence of that. That is our concern.

New Clause 21
	 — 
	RECOMPENSE OF THOSE PENALISED BY NON-COMPLIANCE WITH A CONTACT ORDER

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 21, in page 7, line 22 [Clause 4], at end insert—
	'(3A) In deciding whether a person had reasonable excuse for failing to comply with a contact order, the court shall consider—
	(a) the wishes and feelings of the child;
	(b) any concerns about the safety of the child; and
	(c) any concerns about the safety of any member of the child's family.'.
	No. 11, in page 7, line 25, at end insert—
	'(4A) When considering whether to make an enforcement order, the Court shall have regard to the principle that, subject to the welfare of the child, the court acts on the presumption that a child's welfare is best served through reasonable contact with both his parents unless good reason to the contrary is shown.'.
	No. 18, in page 7, line 25, at end insert—
	'( ) When considering whether the person has a reasonable excuse the welfare of the child is to be the court's paramount consideration.'.
	No. 16, in page 9, line 15, at end insert—
	'(5A) A court that proposes to make an enforcement order must order for the separate representation of the child, unless it is satisfied that it is not necessary to do so in order to safeguard his interests.'.
	No. 10, in page 10, line 26 [Clause 5], leave out subsections (7) and (8).

Tim Loughton: New clause 21 deals with compensatory contact, a subject that we raised in Committee. It deals with what I would call serial breaches of contact orders, and with how enforcement should be made against them. We have all acknowledged the lack of research on the failure of contact orders to work in too many cases. We know that about 70,000 contact orders are granted each year, and we know how many result in a revisit to the court because one of the two parties involved has not adhered to the order.
	Several hon. Members referred to the Oxford university research paper today. It underlines what it calls the "situational power" of the resident parent, the cost of returning to court—often against a legally aided partner—and the slowness of the legal system. It also highlights the fact that a parent can fall out of touch with a child if he or she is denied the opportunity to see them over an extended period because of pending court action. The father or, less usually, the mother would subsequently become unfamiliar to the child. The child, particularly if young and impressionable, might then be less willing to see the non-resident parent. Those examples are cited by Oxford university as reasons why a parent with residency is in a much stronger position. If such a parent were minded to play the system, he or she could use it to restrict the opportunities of the non-resident parent to maintain meaningful contact with the children.
	The problem is that the only real penalty that the courts have against someone who breaches a contact order is to levy a charge of contempt of court, and that is rarely done. The courts are reluctant to take that course of action because it could result in charges being brought against the parent, and that is regarded as the nuclear option.
	We do not know the extent of the problem. I recently tabled a parliamentary question to the Minister of State, Department for Constitutional Affairs, the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman), asking how many people had breached child contact orders in the past few years. She replied that
	"it is not possible to identify the number of cases in which failure to comply with a contact order leads to the matter being dealt with as a contempt of court...This information is not held centrally".—[ Official Report, 15 May 2006; Vol. 446, c. 731W.]
	So we do not know much the sanction of contempt of court is used, but we hear anecdotally from the courts that it is rarely brought to bear.
	Effectively, therefore, a lot of articulate people in the know are able to play the system to frustrate contact by a former partner on the basis that there is a strong chance that no penalty will be brought to bear against them. A judge can say, "Don't breach the contact order, or I'll haul you back before the court and tell you not to breach the contact order again." That is as punchy as it gets. Such a judge would have all the force of an unarmed, one-legged policeman shouting "Stop, or I'll shout 'stop' again" at a fleeing criminal. I am afraid that that is just not good enough. It has given rise to many complaints, and to a perception that the system does not work in favour of a non-resident parent who happens to be at loggerheads with the parent who has custody and who is determined to use, in extreme cases, the children as pawns to fight battles with his or her partner rather than acting in the best interest of the children. As has been said today, in most cases what is in their best interest is maximum contact with both parents.
	Let me give the Government their due. They recognise the problem, which is why the Bill exists and why they have added the enforcement orders provisions in clause 4. The clause requires breachers of contact orders to undertake unpaid work if no good reason for the breach is given, and to instigate compensation for financial loss. That may involve travel costs, or a holiday booked by a non-resident parent which becomes impossible when the parent with custody decides to take the children to the other end of the country.
	The provision is good as far as it goes, but it lacks real teeth. Conservative Members are pleased that the Government dropped some of the more draconian measures, such as the tagging of errant parents with custody, which would not have been a fitting penalty in such sensitive cases. However, if—say—a mother with custody is fined, the fine will often be paid from the maintenance paid by her ex-husband. The money will be recycled, and those who lost out most will be the children who can no longer enjoy the benefit of funds intended for their upkeep.
	Those who are determined to flout contact orders will ask "What is the worst that can happen to me?" At present, the answer is "Not a lot." We tabled new clause 21 because we think that what is needed is a proper, recognisable, easily understood sliding scale of penalties, the award of custody against the resident parent being the ultimate sanction against the serial breacher of contact orders who simply will not come into line with what the court has decided.
	If a non-resident parent is deemed fit to share in the upbringing of his or her child, he or she should have the opportunity to do a better job than the parent who has frustrated contact orders, which surely cannot be in the child's best interest if the court has deemed that the child should have contact with both parents. We consider that the compensatory contact time proposed in new clause 21 represents an appropriate and proportionate middle way. It would make the parent at fault think twice. If he or she genuinely thinks that it is harmful for the child to spend more time with the non-resident parent, surely he or she will not risk the award of additional compensatory contact time with the non-resident parent.
	Other countries impose a range of penalties. The Government of the Netherlands have power to suspend child support payments temporarily when a parent has frustrated contact arrangements. In the United States, an occupational driving or sports licence can be suspended. In the state of Arizona, an independent court official is appointed as a go-between to supervise the way in which contact works. Much of the power to frustrate orders is removed from parents. In Germany, non-complying parents can lose their right to manage contact arrangements, which then pass to a court-appointed contact guardian. That is similar to the system in Arizona.
	Surely the middle way suggested in new clause 21 is a more balanced, relevant and proportionate response to the problem with which we are dealing. It would still be subject to checks and balances connected with possible risks to the welfare of the child, which are important features of other parts of the Bill. The burden of proof, however, must fall on the person who has not complied with a court order. It must be for that person to prove that he or she had good cause not to do so.
	We consider the new clause to be sensible, practical, proportionate and workable. It should be seen not as a reward for an aggrieved parent, but as an effective disincentive to the breacher of a contact order who has ignored the judgment of the court.
	Amendment No. 11 would make the enforcement order subject to the principle that the child's best interests are served through reasonable contact with both parents, in the absence of safety considerations. I shall not rehearse the arguments that have already been presented about reasonable contact. Amendment No. 10 deals with the provisions requiring children making applications to obtain the leave of the court. My hon. Friend the Member for Rugby and Kenilworth (Jeremy Wright) may touch on that later.
	I am sure that the hon. Member for Luton, South (Margaret Moran) will shortly speak on her amendment No. 21, which states that decisions on whether there was a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with an order must take account of the wishes and safety of the child. We believe that that will be implicit in the thinking anyway. As I have been at pains to stress, the paramountcy of the child's welfare and of considerations about the child's safety must be taken into account in all our proposals.
	The hon. Lady also tabled amendment No. 16, which concerns the separate representation of a child in court. The amendment has an interesting distinction: until yesterday, one of the signatories was a Minister. I note that she has removed her name; it would have been rather interesting if the Government had declined to accept it. Amendment No. 18, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, states that the child's welfare must be paramount when the court considers whether a person has a reasonable excuse.
	We shall hear what others have to say about the amendments that they have tabled, but we think that our new clause would beef up the Bill and give it real, workable teeth. In its current form, it is a good try, but we do not think that it will work. We believe that new clause 21 will make what the Government want to achieve practicable.

Margaret Moran: My purpose is to ensure that the paramountcy of the child's interests, which we have discussed repeatedly in Committee and today, is made clear in the Bill. I believe that some of the proposals advanced by, in particular, Opposition Members undermine that paramountcy principle. Amendment No. 21 would introduce important safeguards to enforcement proceedings. I believe that while not constituting a bar to the effective enforcement sought by the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton), it would require courts to consider first the ascertainable views of the child and secondly—and most important—any risk of harm to the child or any member of the family when deciding whether a party had a reasonable excuse for breaching an order. The Government have limited the extent of provisions relating to children in clause 4, arguing that breach of contact orders, and their enforcement, are about parents. With my amendment, I am arguing that they should be about children and their welfare.
	As I understand it, the Government argument is that concerns about the child are dealt with when the original contact order is decided by the court. As a result, the principle of the paramountcy of the child's welfare appears, in effect, to have been removed from the clause, as has the standard child's welfare checklist that the Children Act 1989 requires the court to use in all other proceedings. In other words, the clause contains less emphasis on the importance and paramountcy of the child's welfare than any other in the Bill.
	However, children frequently say that the enforcement stage is the most frightening period. The available research shows that the points of contact and enforcement are the most dangerous ones for separating partners, especially women, and for children. Evidence from children's charities suggests that children find the stage of the process when they are in effect being torn between two parents frightening, and that anxiety and other welfare repercussions ensue.
	Research by the Department for Constitutional Affairs into children's wishes and feelings about contact found that children
	"imagined the courts to be 'scary places' with judges who have the capacity to 'punish' their parents. Some children worried that one or other of their parents could be sent to prison for behaviour for which they themselves felt responsible, such as refusing to go on a contact visit."
	In other words, children internalise the conflict going on around them in the court, often after repeated court visits. That must have a damaging effect, and we know from other legislation that cognisance must be taken of the damage inflicted on a child who witnesses such conflict. That is especially true in situations involving domestic violence, but account must be taken of the fact that a child is also damaged who is pulled between parents in the course of repeated court cases about contact. We believe that, in order to address such concerns, the stage of the proceedings covered by clause 4 needs a much stronger focus on children.
	The focus on parents rather than children in clause 4 also fails to acknowledge that the circumstances of a child's safety and welfare may change substantially by the time that the enforcement stage is reached. In many cases, that may be a year or more after the court hearing in respect of the original contact order. Many things can happen in such a long time: the conflict between the parents can escalate, as can the risk to the child, who might be damaged or even abused in that period. It is therefore essential that we reassess the risk to the child at that point.
	As it stands, the Bill assumes that the child's safety and welfare is addressed when the original contact order is made, and that another check is unnecessary. That is badly thought through, however: children are put at greater risk because there is a long gap after the original contact order is made, and also because there is the potential for conflict in repeated court appearances.
	To refocus the clause onto children rather than parents, an amendment was moved in the other place requiring the courts to consider the views of children and any risk of harm. The Minister in the other place agreed with the content of the amendment, and said that the Government were "entirely sympathetic" with its objective. However, the amendment was rejected, with the Minister claiming that the standard welfare checklist of the Children Act 1989 applied and that the amendment was therefore unnecessary.
	However, I am advised by children's charities, and especially the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, that the standard welfare checklist does not apply. It is therefore essential that the safeguards are reintroduced into clause 4, to minimise the risks to children. That is the purpose of amendment No. 21.
	I turn now to amendment No. 16, which deals with the separate representation of the child in contact order proceedings. The National Youth Advocacy Service published a review of 52 cases involving 95 children whom it represented in family proceedings. It found that, when children are represented, the outcome—for the child and for both parents—is infinitely better than when there is the sort of longstanding conflict that inevitably arises, and which we have discussed already.
	We talked about the need to find a middle way through the conflict between parents. Amendment No. 16 would facilitate that by focusing on the views and needs of the child, and taking the debate away from the tussle—the tug of war or the tug of love—that goes on between parents over their children. It would put the child's views at the centre of decisions made by Parliament and the courts in respect of these terrible cases.
	In their research, NYAS caseworkers studied cases involving intractable disputes—the toughest cases coming before the courts, which form 98 per cent. of the organisation's work load. Of those cases, 52 per cent. had been before the courts for more than three years, and 16 per cent. for between seven and 10 years. It is hard to imagine the impact that repeated court hearings over such a long period about where a child is to reside must have on the people involved. What conflicts would emerge for the child? What feelings would those children have during such a protracted period?
	The NYAS research found that ascertaining the wishes and feelings of the children concerned and actively and safely representing them to the parents could act as a catalyst for the resolution of longstanding, acrimonious and intractable disputes in ways that were effective both for the families and the children. Moreover, they were cost effective too, as they put an end to interminable court proceedings.
	The NYAS research found that future contact arrangements were made successfully in 86 per cent. of cases, and that in 95 per cent. of cases the representation of the child's wishes and feelings had a significant positive effect on decision making. In 89 per cent. of cases, the NYAS report on the child's wishes and feelings coincided with the outcome of the proceedings. That shows that the court listened to the NYAS representations, and that they led to a satisfactory outcome.
	That experience shows that representing the wishes and feelings of the child can have a very beneficial effect in resolving intractable disputes between parents. Parents can be brought to realise and acknowledge the true feelings that their child is enduring, with the result that both find it much easier to give up their entrenched positions. They are less likely to be locked into a battle of, "He said, she said", and interminable arguments about the rights and wrongs of each party, perhaps going back over many years, with the digging up of old disputes and bitterness that inevitably occurs in such proceedings. All those things, which can go on for years in such cases, can be resolved because there is a focus on the needs of the child and their experience, giving parents the opportunity to step back from conflict. At the end of the process, they feel that a satisfactory arrangement has been achieved because the child was at the centre of the proceedings.
	That approach also provides a more constructive foundation for future co-parenting. Relationships between the parents are much better after that type of process than if an ordinary conflictual court hearing had taken its usual course. There are beneficial effects all round as well as benefits for the future parenting of the child.
	The results in the report were not a one-off; they were replicated by the mediation centre in Stafford and CAFCASS recently carried out a review of the outcomes of approximately 100 cases in which children had been similarly represented and which also reported positive outcomes. At the time of the review not one of those 100 cases had come back to court. The system was efficient and effective and enabled the achievement of good outcomes for all parties. The research shows a growing body of evidence indicating that instead of children's representation being seen as an expensive add-on to court proceedings it could and should be seen as having the potential to bring long-running and distressing disputes about residence and contact to an end in ways that are fair to parents and are in the child's best interests.
	In addition, by stopping the revolving door of proceedings that we see in case after case, such measures can make the court process much more cost-effective. To summarise the beneficial effects: cases where children were caught in intractable and long-running disputes would be brought to earlier resolution; the distress and harm suffered by children involved in the revolving door of continual proceedings would be limited; there would be a reduction in the potential for disputes between parents to become increasingly acrimonious—as it does over time—and in cases where there are questions about safety, separate representation of the child's wishes and feelings provides information that is invaluable in helping the court to decide what is safe in the long term and what is in the child's best interests. That representation provides objective information, rather than the hearsay that is sometimes expressed in court, which will distinguish the non-resident parent who poses no threat to their child from the minority who may pose such a risk.
	Those outcomes are in the interests of both parents. By shortening contact disputes and by helping in the assessment of allegations about safety, they could also address some of the concerns from fathers groups, which were expressed earlier, that false allegations are being made. The emphasis is being put back on to the child's welfare rather than on the grievances of father against mother or vice versa. The debate will be taken out of that battlefield.
	The system would be cost-effective. Disputes can run for a long time and cases regularly return to court to incur significant financial and emotional costs to several parties. The cost of such court processes is prohibitive and when we add the costs incurred by other agencies—social services, children's services, CAFCASS and so on—to support parents and children suffering from the dispute, we see that such cases cost a huge amount not only in emotional disturbance to child but also to the public purse. The savings gained from minimising such costs would offset the cost of providing separate representation for the child.
	I am not proposing that all children be separately represented in proceedings, which is one argument that has been made against the proposal. I am asking that section 122 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 be implemented, thus giving children a potential right to be represented. That right can be exercised at the discretion of the court in circumstances specified by the court rules and guidance in the legislation, which could act as a filter for the number of cases using separate representation of the child. The NSPCC, a key advocate of the proposal, expects that no more than 1,500 to 2,000 cases a year will be separately represented. We know, from the Government's research, especially the research recently commissioned by the DCA, that they believe that separate representation can be effective.
	The DCA report, published in March, recommended an amendment to the Bill to ensure that children are separately represented in enforcement proceedings. That is the aim of the amendment. We are working in accordance with the DCA research and its specific recommendation for such a provision. Time after time in the debate, we have observed that there is a lack of research and evidence on many aspects of the Bill, and I welcome the commitment given by Ministers in Committee to carry out further research. However, separate representation is one area where we have a clear steer, because research has been carried out, so it would be perverse to ignore what little research there is when it gives us the positive recommendation that representation of the views and feelings of the child can have a beneficial effect.
	It is also essential that we give judges a consistent message about our views on representation of the child. Section 122 of the 2002 Act is an essential part of the framework of provisions available to the courts, but without a clear statutory provision for separate representation of the child's interests other parts of the Bill will be undermined; for example, it is no good making accurate risk assessments if there is no one to put the child's case in court. Ambiguity about the implementation of section 122 and the way in which separate representations are dealt with in the Bill means that we risk sending confusing messages to judges.
	The amendment therefore seeks to enhance the compliance, consistency and effectiveness of decisions on the representation of the child's views. We have a long history of legislating for the separate representation of children but, sadly, we do not have such a good history of implementing that legislation. Separate representation provision was incorporated in section 64 of the Family Law Act 1996, but it was shelved. In 2002, Parliament made the case for the separate representation of children in the Adoption and Children Act but, again, implementation has been delayed and perhaps postponed indefinitely. When are we going to do what we have repeatedly said we want to do in legislation and implement the representation of the child? The amendment benefits all parties, and it proves our determination to represent children's views in such proceedings, so I commend it to the House.

Annette Brooke: I concur with everything that the hon. Member for Luton, South (Margaret Moran) said. It is easy to be led along other routes, but she rightly brought the debate back to focus on the interests of the child. She made some very powerful points indeed about the benefits for both the child and the parents of taking the child's wishes on board. Her argument is not just emotional, as it is backed by clear evidence from the National Youth Advocacy Service and others. That should be our starting point, as we are here to do what is best for the child.
	I support amendment No. 21, although we have proposed an alternative in amendment No. 18. Hon. Members who served on the Committee will recall that we had a long debate about the fact that the principle that the child's interests should be paramount was not maintained in clauses 4 and 5, which caused some of us a great deal of concern. The hon. Member for Luton, South and I approached the issue from different directions, only to realise that we were saying the same thing. The hon. Member for Stockport (Ann Coffey) made a powerful case, in which she pointed out that the child's interests were taken into consideration when the contact order was made. I remained uneasy, however, about the fact that, under clause 4, someone may offer a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with a contact order. It could be a straightforward matter of an urgent hospital appointment, but I cited a constituency case in which a contact order stipulated that the father was to visit the child at the mother's home. The mother is petrified of those visits—there are no two ways about it—and, although measures have been taken to return to court, that will take a worryingly long time.
	Alarm bells therefore rang when I saw the provision for reasonable excuse, as I believe that the court must consider the primary interests of the child. The hon. Member for Stockport made a cogent argument in which she said that that had already been considered, but there was a strong case for restating the paramountcy principle. The hon. Member for Luton, South reminded us that in Committee we were told that the welfare checklist applies, but the NSPCC says that it does not. There is therefore a fundamental difference in opinion—either it does or it does not—so we need a clear statement in  Hansard about the absolute truth before we move on.
	In many ways, I prefer amendment No. 21 to our amendment, because it makes open reference to
	"the wishes and feelings of the child".However, they both aim to achieve the same objective. I have put my name to amendment No. 16 because it makes an important proposal, which was first included in the Adoption and Children Act 2002. Time has passed since the introduction of that measure, so it is strange that it still has not been implemented.
	It seemed to me that there was an absolute belief that the measure would be implemented. It was then deferred while the Department for Constitutional Affairs commissioned research, but that research has now been published and recommends that the separate representation of children is appropriate and beneficial in some cases. I cannot understand why one Department is saying one thing and, if the new clause is not agreed to tonight, another Department will be saying something different. It should be of concern to us that in this critical area, Departments are not saying the same thing. I hope that the Minister will reassure us that he is working closely with his colleagues in the DCA and that measures will be introduced to enable section 122 of the 2002 Act, at long last, to be implemented, because separate representation could be very beneficial in particularly difficult cases.
	That idea has clearly been accepted for a long time and caution has been exercised. As the hon. Member for Luton, South rightly said, this is one area in which the research has been completed, although it is very poor that more research was not carried out, given that the consultation process started five years ago. The research was carried out by a Government Department, rather than a think-tank that could perhaps have been criticised for starting from a particular perspective. In essence, the Government recommended such an amendment, so if they do not agree with the precise wording of ours, I hope that the Minister will show us clearly the way forward on the important issue of separate representation.

Jeremy Wright: I want to say a few words in support of new clause 21 and amendment No. 10. As the House is now well aware, new clause 21 makes provision for the court to have an order for compensatory contact available to it as one sanction for the breach of a contact order. The primary advantage of that would be that it is only an order of compensatory contact that can give effect to the original intention of the court. Only when we can put right what has gone wrong will the court be able to see its original order being put into effect. That is important.
	The touchstone at the heart of everything that has been said in the course of this debate—rightly so—is that all of us in the House are concerned to make sure that the welfare of the child is the first consideration of all those involved in the court process. If that is so, and assuming that the court process operates as it should and as we would expect it to, the court could come to the conclusion that, in the best interests of the child and the child's welfare, a certain provision should be made for contact with the non-resident parent. That must self-evidently be the case. The court's view will be that, for a particular period of time, the child should have contact with the non-resident parent.
	The new clause would come into effect only in circumstances in which the contact arrangement that the court had decided was appropriate had not taken effect for one reason or another. That must mean that the child's best interests are not being served—because contact is not taking place in the way that the court ordered that it should. I agree entirely with the point made by the hon. Member for Luton, South (Margaret Moran) that what is to be avoided is the perception by the child, or anyone else, that parents are being punished, especially when that has a negative impact on the child. However, surely it must be right that, in order to look after the best interests of the child, the court has the option, at the very least, of being able to put the child into the position that it originally intended the child to be in. That is why I support new clause 21.
	The idea behind amendment No. 10 was discussed in Committee. The same mistake that was made in Committee has been made again. There should be an addition to the amendment to say that subsection (6)(d) on page 10 of the Bill should also be deleted. The effect of amendment No. 10, as it stands, is to delete subsections (7) and (8) of proposed new section 110 of the Children Act 1989, which would be inserted by clause 5 of the Bill.Subsections (7) and (8) deal with subsection (6)(d)of the proposed new section, which adds "the child concerned" to the list of people who are able to apply for compensation for financial loss. Of course, that is the substantial aspect of the measure that is objectionable to Conservative Members. Subsections (7) and (8) contain qualifications that deal with the child obtaining the leave of the court before making such an application, which will be granted under subsection (8) only if the court is satisfied that the child has the necessary "sufficient understanding" to make the application. It thusfollows that amendment No. 10 should also delete subsection (6)(d).
	As subsection (6)(d) will remain in the Bill, the problem is straightforward. The touchstone of the entire Bill is that the welfare of the child is most important thing. It does not seem sensible or in accordance with that principle that a child should be encouraged to enter into an arena in which a discussion is held—perhaps a quite acrimonious discussion—about whether financial compensation should be made in one direction or another. Of course, that argument was made in Committee, when the Government said that it is perfectly in order for a child to be involved in the making of a contact order in the first place. That is of course right, but the process is fundamentally different from that involving compensation for financial loss. It is perfectly right to involve a child in decisions about contact because the court recognises that the views of a child about contact are important and thus includes the child as one of the people who can contribute to that process. However, when compensation for financial loss is being considered, blame is being apportioned for something that has gone wrong. That is wholly different in nature from the process of decisions about contact, so it is wholly inappropriate for a child to be involved in such matters.
	It is also hard to conceive of a situation in which a child would need to be involved in such a process. It is difficult to envisage a situation in which the financial loss would not be occasioned to one parent or other, both of whom would be able to make an application for compensation for financial loss under proposed new section 110. Amendment No. 10 would thus remove an unnecessary and possibly damaging aspect of that provision, so I commend it to the House.

Parmjit Dhanda: We are facing up to this. It is one reason why the Bill introduces a range of measures, including contact activities. It gives CAFCASS a new and broader role in befriending couples who are going through separation. To take all of that into account, I think that the hon. Gentleman would probably wish to review what he has said and the way in which he said it. The Bill is an effective measure. I think that all Members in this place and the other place have agreed with that during its passage.
	Amendment No. 10 is identical to the proposition that was debated in Committee. During that debate, Opposition Members clarified that they had meant to omit paragraph 6(d) from new section 110. Unfortunately, they made the same mistake again. That being so, the effect of amendment No. 10 is to continue to allow the child concerned to apply for a financial compensation order to remove the safeguards that would be attached to the application. However, I will proceed on the basis of the intention, which is to prevent the child from applying for a financial compensation order. I think that that is where the Opposition wish to be.
	I sympathise with the concern that children should not become involved in what are essentially pecuniary proceedings, involving usually their parents. I doubt that many children will apply for financial compensation when one of the parties to the proceedings has breached a contact order to which they are subject. That said, there may be a few cases where a child has spent his or her own money to attend contact that did not take place. I imagine that these cases will be few and far between. Nonetheless, they are a possibility, and that is why they have been accounted for.
	Amendment No. 16 would require a court that is considering making an enforcement order to make an order for the separate representation of the child, unless satisfied that it is not necessary to do so to safeguard the child's interests. I do not necessarily agree that that is best done by having separate representation of children in all enforcement proceedings, as amendment No.16 proposes. I have already had discussions with my hon. Friend the Member for Luton, South (Margaret Moran) in private.
	The court can already, under existing provisions, consider separate representation of children, not just at enforcement stage but throughout Children Act 1989 proceedings. Under rule 9.5 of the family proceedings rules, the court may appoint a guardian for the child if it appears that it is in the best interests of the child for him or her to be made a party to the proceedings. That rule will apply also in respect of enforcement orders.
	In April 2004, the president of the family division issued practice direction outlining the circumstances in which the court could consider making a child a party to the proceedings. Those include where the child has a standpoint or an interest that cannot be adequately represented by the other parties, where there is an intractable dispute over contact or residence and where there are serious allegations of physical, sexual or other abuse in relation to that child. The Cardiff university research report draws attention to the disadvantages of separate representation—for example, increased delay, additional stress and confusion to the child, which I think is particularly important and potentially too great a weight of responsibility on what are very young children. Important factors should be weighed up each time a court considers making an order for the separate representation of a child.
	Amendments Nos. 18 and 21 would affect a court's deliberations in deciding whether someone had a reasonable excuse to breach a contact order. Amendment No. 18 would make the welfare of the child paramount in such decisions. Amendment No. 21 would require the court to consider the child's wishes and feelings and any concerns about the child's safety or, indeed, the safety of any member of the family. I am happy to repeat that a reasonable excuse could include a genuine fear of domestic violence, whether to the adult or the child. In so far as ensuring that the courts have sufficient regard to child protection issues, the change proposed is not necessary. Similarly, the court will already take into account the safety of another adult. We should also bear it in mind that not all reasonable excuses involve domestic violence. A medical emergency could be the reason why an order was breached, in which case the considerations in the amendments would not be appropriate.
	Amendment No. 11 would require the court, in considering whether to make an enforcement order, to have regard to the principle that the court should act on the presumption that a child's welfare is best served by reasonable contact with both parents in the absence of a good reason to the contrary. However, the principle is said to be subject to the welfare of the child. In effect, that requires the court to operate subject to a presumption of reasonable contact in deciding whether to make an enforcement order in response to the breach of a contact order. In our view, it would be especially inappropriate to insert a presumption in that context. The original contact order would have already involved the court in considering the welfare of the child as paramount. When presented with enforcement issues, the concern of the court should simply be whether enforcement is necessary and proportionate to secure compliance with a contact order. The matter of what is in the child's best interests will have been considered already.
	I have said already that this is a diverse set of amendments. I hope that I have explained why we would have difficulty in accepting them. I urge hon. Members not to press them to a vote.

Tim Loughton: We have had quite a full debate on, as the Minister says, a diverse selection amendments. I certainly wish to reinforce the points made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Suffolk, Coastal (Mr. Gummer) and my hon. Friend the Member for Rugby and Kenilworth (Jeremy Wright) that the purpose of new clause 21 in particular is to ensure that a parent who might breach a contact order takes that court order seriously and is fully aware of the consequences of not doing so. We have tried to set down a clear and comprehensible penalty that would be understood by a large number of people. It is a form of sanction; it is not about using time with the children as some form of punishment—I went into all the details of why it should not be seen as such—but it is about using a relevant and proportionate deterrent that can be understood by anyone who might seek to breach a contact order without good reason.
	The Minister said that the courts already have ample powers to do such things. If they do, they do not use them. That is the point of new clause 21. They do not use contempt of court penalties, other than in a very few cases. Again, incidents of custody being taken away from one parent and awarded to another are few and far between—it is the nuclear option—so many parents think, "What is the worst that can happen to me?", and it is not very much.
	I am mindful, however, that we are approachingthe cut-off time for the debates on Report. We still have the important section on mediation to consider, soon the basis that I should like at least my hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mrs. Miller) to have a look in on proposing new clause 22 on mediation, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
	 Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, That the clause be read a second time.
	 The House divided: Ayes 164, Noes 261.

Tim Loughton: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. Of course, as well as those who do not sign early-day motions for reasons of personal choice, there are Ministers, who cannot sign them. That means that a vast majority of free-thinking Members put their pens to the motion. Only 146 of those 345, however, were prepared to go into the Lobby this evening, when it really mattered. That speaks volumes about the attitude of certain Members.
	The Minister said that, taken as a whole, the Bill offered improvement in life chances for some of the most vulnerable children in our society, and elsewhere. We, of course, support that intent. She also said that the House was united in wanting to maintain good contact with both parents, and we agree with that too. However, she could not resist tagging on a condemnation of the Opposition's approach, which she said compromised the paramountcy of the child's welfare.
	The Minister made that remark even though we have made it quite clear that the welfare of the child was the ultimate consideration in every case. We would not have proposed any of our amendments if we thought that the paramountcy of the child's welfare would be compromised. She called us misguided, but at least we are misguided with integrity.
	I am encouraged that the Government acknowledge the problems that result from the increasing numbers of families who split up. There are 12 million children in this country, and one in four experience the repercussions when couples separate. The Government also acknowledge the need to do something to beef up the penalties against serial flouters of contact orders, and to monitor how contact proceedings are carried out.
	The Government recognise too that something more must be done to prevent couples from going to court in the first place, as that is what leads to the long-drawn-out, expensive and acrimonious legal action that is the reason for this Bill's introduction. That is why proactive mediation is so important. All the Opposition amendments have been predicated on the need to safeguard the welfare of children, but the problem is that Ministers too often seem to be hiding behind the paramountcy principle that was introduced—by a Conservative Govt—in section 1 of the Children Act 1989. It remains relevant and valuable to this day, but Ministers use it as an excuse for not taking the serious and radical action that would go a long way to addressing the problems that we have all acknowledged. Instead, they go through the motions, posturing, ticking the boxes and claiming that problems will be sorted out.
	The Bill is full of good intentions and warm words, but it shies away from the radical overhaul of the legal system that is so vital. On Second Reading, I said that it was a "toothless fudge"—a rather mixed metaphor, I admit, but we gave the Government the benefit of the doubt. We argued long and hard—on Second Reading, in Committee and on Report today—for serious improvements that would have given the Bill real teeth and firmed up the fudge. However, this Minister and this Government have singularly failed to engage in the debate. They have failed to take on board—

Roger Gale: You, Mr. Speaker, better than most, will understand that those of us with other duties in this House sometimes have difficulty in participating as much as we would like to do in all aspects of legislation. I have studied the Bill on paper—only on paper, not in the Chamber—and followed its processes in the House of Lords, on Second Reading in this House, in Committee and, finally, this evening. It is with a very heavy heart—I say this curiously, in a sense—that I rise to support my friends on the Front Bench, because there is much of merit in the deliberations behind the Bill and, indeed, in the Bill. However, the fact is that, on its Third Reading, it is still deeply flawed. After all the effort that has been put in—I believe with good will—by both Government and Opposition Front Benchers in both Houses, that is tremendously sad.
	It is one of the difficulties of these Houses that after a Bill starts in the House of Lords and is passed on to the House of Commons—where it is studied and read—has its Second Reading, its Committee stage and its Third Reading, it has nowhere else to go other than on to the statute book, or out. I sense that tonight, there might have been a willingness among Members in all parts of the House to send the Bill somewhere else and to think again. However, and as you have pointed out, Mr. Speaker, this is a Third Reading debate, so this is the full stop and, as things stand, we have nowhere else to go.
	As my Front-Bench colleagues have suggested, the fact is that elements are missing from the Bill. You admonished, Mr. Speaker, the hon. Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole (Annette Brooke), who spoke for the Liberal Democrats, for commenting on what were almost Second Reading issues. Of course, we have to comment on what is in the Bill, but we must also comment on what is not in it and on the opportunities missed, to use the phrase coined by my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton).
	There are issues relating to the rights of parents and grandparents that have not properly been touched on. It might surprise you to learn that I am not yet a grandparent, Mr. Speaker, but I wish I was. However, like most of us, I have constituency advice surgeries to which grandparents come to plead a cause. If the Bill is about anything, it is about children, and such grandparents can offer an opportunity to children who are the subjects—I hesitate to say victims—of broken marriages.
	I suppose that, at this point, I ought to place my own interest on the record. I am a divorcee and I have a daughter who is the victim—if that is the right word—of a broken marriage. Happily, my former wife and I managed to work together to look after our daughter. My current wife was a single parent—the father of her child was murdered. I adopted my eldest son. I feel quite strongly about these matters. The relationships—and the contact—between people and their children are vital, but the most vital issue is the children.
	To come back to the point about grandparents, we are missing an opportunity. The Bill does not say that grandparents have rights. We were talking about mediation. You were otherwise engaged, Mr. Speaker, but, in a brief intervention just before the last guillotine, my hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mrs. Miller) sought to indicate the breadth and the depth that mediation might embrace. However, that is not in the Bill. We ought to be talking about creating opportunities for people to get together, not to fall apart.
	In the interests of the children, we ought to be talking about how we can maximise the contact between the two parents—if we believe, and I think that the House still does, that fundamentally children need two parents and the love, affection and attention of two parents. We cannot achieve that by compulsion; we can achieve it only by the getting together of willing parties. We will not get willing parties together by forcing them into funnels of courts of law, where they are represented by people who may think that they are presenting the interests of children, but who are in fact presenting the interests of two separating people. Children need the support of a flexible system.
	I am very sorry. I believe that the Minister is committed to the cause. I happen to think that my hon. Friends on the Front Bench are committed to the cause. I wish that the Bill could go somewhere other than to a Third Reading vote to say yes or no, but it cannot. The Bill is flawed. As my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham has said, it is an opportunity missed. On that basis, with a very heavy heart, I will have to oppose a Bill that has much merit in it, but does not go far enough.

Stewart Jackson: I am pleased to be able to conclude the Third Reading debate.  [ Interruption. ] It is gratifying to know that I am the cause of such hilarity on the Government Front Bench—particularly on the part of the Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Plaskitt). This is a serious issue. We have had a good debate on Report and at Third Reading. I reiterate the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for North Thanet (Mr. Gale) that we could have had a great deal of consensus at Third Reading. We could have been united across the House on the fact that we all care about the future of our children and their family lives and prospects, and that we all care about fairness and equality between men and women. We all understand the tragedy that people's lives do not go as they planned and that they split up and separate, and there is animosity, bitterness and hatred. We could have taken the opportunity to do something about that by sending an important practical signal.
	I said in Committee that kind words butter no parsnips. I was right because although we have heard a lot of kind words from Ministers, we have not seen solid proposals. I congratulate the Under-Secretary of State for Education and Skills, the hon. Member for Gloucester (Mr. Dhanda), on his appointment and welcome him to the Dispatch Box. We go back some way from our days in the London borough of Ealing. His career has taken off, and although mine is on a slower trajectory, I hope to catch up.

Stewart Jackson: I hear what my hon. Friend says.
	We wanted consensus. We have done our best to ensure that good sense and practical experience inform the debate. We have received an undertaking from the Minister on reviewing the situation on grandparents' access, which was addressed by new clause 19. There will also be a review of the paramountcy principle and an examination of how that works in the family court system. We have done our best, and I thank hon. Members such as the hon. Member for Stafford(Mr. Kidney) for doing their best to achieve consensus. We are committed to the changes that were proposed by the amendments that we tabled, and we wait for a Conservative Government to enact those changes.

Tim Farron: I am grateful for the opportunity to address the House on the future of the coronary care unit at Westmorland general hospital in Kendal in my constituency. The unit is under severe threat of closure. The board of the University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Trust recently launched a public consultation on the future of Westmorland general hospital. The trust presented four options, all of which would leave Westmorland general with acute medical services cut and reduced hospital beds, and three of those options would lead to the closure of the excellent coronary care unit.
	It seems clear that the options presented, with the exception of the unspoken fifth option—to maintain the status quo—all threaten patient safety in the south Lakeland area, so I seek the Minister's assistance in securing the future of Westmorland general hospital in the interests of local people and of the hundreds of thousands of tourists who pass through the area every year.
	The trust states that the proposed closures are a result of a £6.3 million deficit in its budget and the subsequent need to achieve cost savings. I sympathise with the trust in that respect, but I am reminded of the Secretary of State's repeated undertakings that, in the process of trusts moving to balance their books, there would be no threat to patient safety. For example, on7 June, the Secretary of State said:
	"I've always been clear that there should be no trade-off between high quality patient care and actions to improve financial management."
	I therefore hope that the Minister will seek to intervene, given that the options presented for consultation by the trust all threaten high quality patient care and compromise patient safety.
	People in my constituency who have a suspected heart attack or another acute condition such as a stroke will normally be transported by ambulance to Westmorland general hospital in Kendal. Should emergency admissions close at Kendal, the next nearest hospitals are in Lancaster and Barrow. Closure of the Kendal unit would lead to a significant increase in travelling times for people with acute conditions before they can be stabilised in hospital. It has been said that paramedics could stabilise patients with acute conditions in a similar way to doctors in hospitals, but that argument is erroneous. As the Minister knows, paramedics have a limited protocol for the administration of clot-busting drugs—in about 90 per cent. of cases, paramedics cannot administer life-saving clot busters and must concentrate on getting the patient to hospital safely and as soon as possible.
	My constituency is large and rural. It includes parts of the Lake district and the Yorkshire dales and the rest of the south Lakeland area. The prospect of getting a patient with a suspected heart attack from Grasmere or Garsdale to Lancaster instead of to Kendal fills me and thousands of my constituents with incredulity and dread. I have spoken to many heart patients, health professionals and others who tell me that the additional journey time to Lancaster or Barrow would significantly threaten patient safety. The Minister will be well aware of the golden hour within which patients with acute conditions must be stabilised in order to give them the best chance of survival. Three quarters of my constituency lies more than an hour's drive to Lancaster or Barrow, and that does not include the length of time for an ambulance to get to a call-out in a remote rural area.
	Although the local ambulance service is excellent, it already struggles to meet target call-out times and depends upon dozens of excellent first responder groups around south Cumbria to provide on-the-spot assistance to people with acute conditions in advance of the arrival of the ambulance. The coronary care unit at Westmorland general hospital is excellent and has committed, talented staff and a track record that is second to none in our area. As one might expect in a large trust area, each of the three hospitals—Lancaster, Barrow and Westmorland general—has a coronary care unit. Of the three, Westmorland general at Kendal has the record for the quickest door-to-needle time: the administration of clot-busting drugs to patients in the shortest and safest period following their arrival in hospital. In addition, 75 per cent. of patients reach Westmorland general hospital within acceptable time limits, which is the same figure as the hospital in Lancaster, but there is no doubt that that figure will drop significantly if patients are transported further in the event that the Kendal unit closes.
	It hardly takes an expert in geography or transport movement to work out that the closure of the Kendal unit would make it impossible for people in south Lakeland to get to Lancaster within current target times. I cannot stress too strongly that the longer the time before the administration of crucial clot-busting drugs, which, in most cases, cannot be done in an ambulance and must be done at hospital, the greater the permanent damage to the heart and the greater risk to patient survival. That brings me to a crucial point—the additional pressure that will be placed on the ambulance trust as a result of any reduction of services at Westmorland general hospital.
	Earlier this year, the Secretary of State kindly met me and the hon. Members for Lancaster and Wyre(Mr. Wallace) and for Morecambe and Lunesdale (Geraldine Smith) to discuss NHS services in Morecambe bay. At that meeting, in response to a question on a separate matter, the Secretary of State remarked upon the senselessness of one part of the NHS making savings by shifting additional cost burdens on to another part of the NHS, yet that very situation will be encountered should emergency medical services be removed or reduced at Westmorland General hospital. The knock-on effect will be an increase in ambulance journeys across a county boundary and an increase in the pressure placed upon paramedics as they attempt to keep patients going for much longer periods of time on journeys of up to twice current lengths.
	Just as the hospital trust has not released any details relating to the money that it hopes to save as a result of the various options to downgrade our hospital, neither has there been any assessment of the likely additional costs that our local ambulance trust will incur as a direct consequence of the downgrading. How can it be right to allow one NHS trust to move towards balancing its budget by placing additional financial difficulties at the door of another trust at the expense of public safety?
	Good use of public money is a major consideration in the Government's efforts to tackle the problem of NHS deficits. The Minister will therefore be concerned to hear that, just three years ago, a state-of-the-art cardiac catheterisation lab was built at Westmorland general hospital at a cost of more than £2 million. That lab would in all probability be forced to close were there not a coronary care unit on site to support its work. This is tangible evidence that Government investment in the NHS will be wiped away as a result of the trusts current proposals.
	University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay Trust serves a population of 320,000 people. Most trusts of that size are urban or suburban in nature and have one large hospital. In our area, we have two district general hospitals at Lancaster and Barrow and a major third hospital, Westmorland general, in Kendal. The cost of operating three hospitals as opposed to one is vast—comfortably more than the size of the trust's deficit, and perhaps more than twice that amount. The Minister will be aware that no meaningful element of the funding formula even remotely addresses the huge additional cost of operating health services in a rural area such as ours.
	Let me reiterate how important it is that the Morecambe bay trust area retains three hospitals. There are 80,000 people in my constituency and, in addition, hundreds of thousands of tourists all year round, no doubt including many Members of this House from time to time. The overwhelming majority of those people live or stay in places where it is simply not possible to get to hospital in Lancaster or Barrow in a safe period of time. To each of those people, the threat to close Westmorland general hospital to acute admissions and, in particular, those with suspected strokes or heart attacks is a threat to their safety and an unacceptable escalation of risk. I ask the Minister to conduct an urgent review of funding for trusts covering rural areas to take account of their actual spending needs and to ensure that they are not forced into proposing unsafe options for local health care.
	In each of the options presented by the hospitals trust, Westmorland general hospital loses beds, acute admissions wards and rehabilitation wards, as well as the capacity to deal with, for example, suspected stroke patients or patients with diabetic emergencies. In all but one of the options, it loses the excellent coronary care unit. In each case, that would threaten the safety of local people and tourists and cause additional anguish and distress for patients, particularly older people, who would have to be treated a long way from their homes, making it much more difficult, and sometimes impossible, for them to receive visitors.
	What is more, there are no plans significantly to increase capacity at Barrow or Lancaster. Given that there is already huge pressure on beds and resources at both those hospitals, it is inevitable that the quality of provision will suffer as a result of these cuts. The unspoken fear is that that downgrading of services across our area, particularly at Kendal, threatens Westmorland general hospital's very survival. Some have made the disingenuous case that it is no place for emergency medical cases because of the Royal College of Physicians' general advice that consultants should not be on call at more than one hospital site. However, given that consultants are on site at Kendal almost every day anyway and that, in rural areas, proximity to the population is an even greater consideration when thinking about patient safety, it seems clear that the Royal College of Physicians would not wish to undermine the viability of vital emergency services in rural areas and that its advice is taken out of context in this respect.
	I hope that the Minister will take urgent steps to prevent the downgrading of Westmorland general hospital, because the options proposed by the trust and their knock-on effects would be contrary to the Secretary of State's promise that none of the savings being made by trusts should lead to patients suffering a reduction in service. In seeking ways to enable the trust to present acceptable options, she may wish to consider the fact that the local strategic health authority has announced a surplus of £33 million and that a small amount of that surplus could be used to take the pressure off Morecambe bay to prevent it from making damaging decisions that threaten patient safety.
	In January, I joined more than 2,000 constituents in a march through Kendal in protest at the primary care trust's plans to close mental health wards at Westmorland general. That campaign was broadly successful, as adult mental health services have since been saved. My constituents and I are resolute in our support of our local hospital. We have not developed campaign fatigue since that victory and we are now engaged in another campaign to save local services.
	I am truly grateful for the opportunity to speak, because the debate could not have come at a more crucial time for my constituency. The Minister will be pleased to hear that I have no appetite for point scoring, finger jabbing or making accusations. My purpose is to seek her help in preserving the future of emergency medical admissions at Westmorland general hospital.
	A familiar and sobering sight in my constituency, especially in the summer months, is the helicopter air ambulance flying to rescue injured people on the fells and lift them to hospital for emergency treatment. I cannot help thinking that, if relatively small financial pressures are allowed to lead to the closure of Kendal hospital to acute medical admissions, those who meet calamity on the fells and are rescued by helicopter will be in a much less perilous position than residents of the lakes and dales and the rest of South Lakeland who suffer a heart attack or a stroke, whose lives will hang in the balance on a journey of an hour and a half along tourist-clogged country lanes to the nearest hospital.